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Abstract 
To date, the negotiations over chemicals in the Translatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
have not shown sufficient ambition. The talks have focused too much on the differences in the two 
‘systems’, rather than on the actual levels of health and environmental protection for substances 
regulated by both the US and the EU. Given the accomplishments within the OECD and the UN 
Globally Harmonised System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals (GHS), the question is 
whether TTIP can be any more ambitious in the area of chemicals? We find that there is no detailed or 
systematic knowledge about how the two levels of protection in chemicals compare, although 
caricatures and stereotypes abound. This is partly due to an obsessive focus on a single US federal law, 
the Toxic Subtances Control Act (TSCA), whereas in practice US protection depends on many statutes 
and regulations, as well as on voluntary withdrawals (under pressure from the Environmental 
Protection Agency) and severe common law liability. This paper makes the economic case for firmly 
addressing the regulatory barriers, discusses the EU’s proposals, finds that the European Parliament’s 
Resolution on TTIP of July 2015 lacks a rationale (for chemicals), argues that both TSCA and REACH 
ought to be improved (based on ‘better regulation’), discusses the link with a global regime, advocates 
significant improvement of market access where equivalence of health and environmental objectives is 
agreed and, finally, proposes to lower the costs for companies selling in both markets by allowing them 
to opt into the other party’s more stringent rules, thereby avoiding duplication while racing-to-the-top.  
The ‘living agreement’ on chemicals ought to be led by a new TTIP institution authorised to establish 
the level of health and environmental protection on both sides of the Atlantic for substances regulated 
on both sides. These findings will lay the foundation for a highly beneficial lowering of trading costs 
without in any way affecting the level of protection. Indeed, this is exactly what TTIP is, or should be, 
all about.   
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Greater TTIP Ambition in Chemicals: 
Why and how 
E. Donald Elliott and Jacques Pelkmans* 
Paper No. 10 in the CEPS-CTR project “TTIP in the Balance’’ 
and CEPS Special Report No. 114 / July 2015 
Politics is the art of the possible. 
Otto Von Bismarck (1867). 
1. Introduction and purpose 
This paper discusses the chemicals chapter of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP), in particular the regulatory part. The flaw we see in US-EU chemical 
regulatory cooperation is that the focus has been far too much on the differences in procedures 
between the two regulatory systems rather than on what ultimately matters: the actual level of 
SHEC (safety, health, environment and consumer) protection provided for substances that are 
regulated by both the EU and the US. This flaw is still valid today in TTIP. The only difference 
is that the TTIP initiative is being sold as far more ambitious in terms of regulatory cooperation 
for the North Atlantic than ever before, and that it might also influence regulatory ambitions 
of other WTO partners. But this prospect seems not to apply to chemicals, which is precisely 
one motivation of the paper. To date, the TTIP talks over chemicals have not been ambitious 
enough in our view and there is no chance whatsoever that a TTIP chemical regime will 
emerge as a shining example for the rest of the world. Within the confines of this paper, we 
shall attempt to demonstrate that it is far more productive to focus on the identification of 
equivalent levels of protection against risky chemical substances than to harp on the ‘systemic’ 
divergences.  
So far, the political and societal debates on the chemical aspects of TTIP have been neither 
productive nor constructive. They are stuck in stereotypes that are believed simply because 
certain forces keep on repeating them endlessly, rather than systematically scrutinising the 
various arguments. Outside industry (but in the present climate, industry suffers from a 
credibility problem, rightly or wrongly), few, if any, experts or independent analysts take the 
trouble to publish careful assessments and steer the public debate into fact-finding and 
constructive analyses. Assertions about a lowering of levels of protection are repeated, 
although such lowering was neither explicit nor implicit in the mandate; indeed, the opposite 
is found in writings and in numerous statements of the EU and by the negotiators on both 
sides. Discussions tend to be elusive or highly principled, complemented by plenty of 
accusations, misunderstandings, caricatures, recriminations or indeed outright suspicion. In 
such a political climate for the case of chemicals, the original ideas behind TTIP tend to be 
forgotten or dismissed without any search for the facts or for solid ideas. Such a style of 
‘debating’ and the creation of a climate of profound suspicion, despite the distinct separation 
between the untouchable level(s) of protection and having a focus on the instruments (as 
indeed is done for other TTIP sectoral annexes), is not in keeping with the aim and spirit of 
TTIP. It cannot be in the EU and/or US public interest either.  
                                                   
* E. Donald Elliott is Professor of Law (adjunct) at Yale University and Senior Counsel, Covington & 
Burling LLP in Washington, D.C. Jacques Pelkmans is Senior Research Fellow at CEPS and Visiting 
Professor at the College of Europe, Bruges. 
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The aim of our paper is to introduce at least the beginnings of a fruitful factual analysis of what 
can and cannot be done in chemicals in TTIP and why. Our paper will not deeply discuss the 
differences between the two systems, as this has been done before: this divergence is, for now, 
far too great. Nevertheless, the knowledge and understanding of how the US regulates 
chemicals are poor in Europe and therefore we do offer a concise ‘primer’ on it (see Box 1 in 
section 4). However, agreeing that ‘the systems’ are different is not the end of the story but 
precisely the beginning! Protecting citizens and workers against risky chemicals is less a matter 
of systems and much more, if not decisively, a matter of checking the protection in terms of 
results for each and every substance. When focusing on the level of protection against risky 
chemicals – and not on ‘the systems’ or their equivalence – we shall focus on two possibilities: 
one is TTIP action when, for individual substances, the level of protection is found to be 
equivalent in the US and EU, and the other is an opt-in choice for companies to the more 
stringent regime for substances that are regulated on both sides, automatically allowing access 
to the market with the less-stringent regime but at the price of following the more-restrictive 
standard in both markets. The EU and the US can act together in TTIP and in its living 
agreement in all cases where the level of protection is adequate, despite the systemic 
differences of how this came about. However, where equivalence of protection levels is found, 
it is far from easy to appreciate what can be done and requires innovative policy thinking. This 
is what our paper attempts to do, in the spirit of TTIP as first formulated in the US-EU High 
Level Group (2013) and later in the TTIP mandates.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. We begin by querying whether the often-mentioned 
‘systemic’ divergences in chemical regulation of the US and the EU are a justifiable reason to 
remain unambitious in TTIP. The present authors do not think so. Instead, the ultimate goals 
of chemical regulation should be the main focus of TTIP: where exactly are the levels of 
protection similar and where not, and when similar, can the trading costs, in particular 
duplications of many costly obligations, be addressed? In section 3 we observe that the TTIP 
chemicals discussions are modest, in sharp contrast with suggestions, at high transatlantic 
level, nearly two decades ago. Have all such efforts come to nothing at all? This is elaborated 
in section 4, recalling US-EU chemical regulatory cooperation since the mid-1990s. In the late 
1990s, proposals were far more ambitious than even TTIP is today! It is no exaggeration to 
characterise the intervening period as an era of missed opportunities, whether selective 
harmonisation, carefully crafted mutual recognition or targeted equivalence agreements. 
Section 5 explains in some detail how modestly TTIP is now pursued in chemicals. 
Unfortunately, the information on the US position is scant, and no transparency has been 
provided so far. Therefore, we mainly rely on the EU positioning. The EU proposals, as 
published in November 2014, are summarised in Box 3. However, we have also inserted a Box 
2 on the OECD’s accomplishments in chemicals regulatory cooperation; this begs the question 
of how much more ambitious TTIP in chemicals really is. Some highly tentative discussion of 
the unspoken background to the proposals in Box 3 is provided as well.  
This discussion is followed by two sections: one (section 6) about perceptions and criticism 
when contrasting the EU’s Regulation on Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and 
Restriction of Chemicals (REACH)) and the US Toxic Subtances Control Act (TSCA,) and 
section 7 about ‘frozen’ policy attitudes in Brussels and Washington, under the heading 
‘carved in stone’. A brief and inevitably incomplete discussion of the links with a global 
regime, so important now that the share of non-TTIP chemical production in the world is 
increasing steadily, is provided in section 8. It deals with potential positive spill-overs and US 
objections against REACH as the basis for a world regime. Our approach to eventually faciliate 
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mutual market access between the US and the EU, highly tentative to be sure, is spelled out in 
section 9. As noted, it focuses on SHEC (safety, health, environment and consumer) objectives 
and functional equivalence of protection against risky substances, in areas where the level of 
legal regulation is similar or allowing companies to opt into abiding by the more stringent 
system everywhere. The latter can improve market access immediately, as an early harvest in 
TTIP, and is spelled out in section 10. The final section 11 concludes. 
2. Divergences in regulatory systems are not the right focus in TTIP 
A quarter century ago, during the heyday of rational actor models derived from neo-classical 
economics, UC Berkeley political scientist and business professor David Vogel made a 
powerful prediction that trade negotiations would result in ‘harmonising up’. By that term, he 
meant adopting the more stringent or precautionary environmental or consumer standards in 
order to obtain the efficiency gains that come from eliminating inconsistencies that impede 
trade for mutual gain. 
Trade liberalization is most likely to strengthen consumer and environmental 
protection when a group of nations has agreed to reduce the role of regulations as 
trade barriers and the most powerful among them has influential domestic 
constituencies that support stronger regulatory standards.1 
As this paper goes to press, it seems highly unlikely that Vogel’s prediction for ‘harmonising 
up’ will come to pass in the TTIP negotiations for chemicals. NGOs and mass publics on both 
sides of the Atlantic are concerned that TTIP will become an excuse for ‘rolling back’ 
regulatory protections.2 Both negotiating parties seem wedded to sticking with their own 
systems for regulating the health and safety issues relating to chemical usage.  
The goal of this paper is to explain why the current negotiations seem unlikely to result in 
mutually-beneficial ‘harmonising up’, as suggested by Vogel’s logic, and to recommend ways 
in which we can eventually achieve more North Atlantic regulatory cooperation in chemicals, 
in particular, by reducing the costs and instances of pointless duplication in the future. We 
consider several possible explanations for why the current negotiations did not set more 
                                                   
1 See Vogel (2012, p. 8). In fairness, Vogel did include a number of caveats, including that there must be 
powerful support for the tougher standards in the domestic politics of the “most powerful” nation in 
the trade talks. Unlike NAFTA, which was the model uppermost in Vogel’s mind, the EU-US 
negotiations are taking place between two relative equals in economic power.  
2 See Matthew Dalton, “TTIP Could Weaken Chemical Rules, Environmental Groups Say”, Wall Street 
Journal Real Time Brussels Blog, 7 October 2014 (http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2014/10/07/ttip-
could-weaken-chemical-rules-environmental-groups-say/). On both sides of the Atlantic, NGOs, often 
jointly, keep repeating these types of messages of doubt, if not suspicion. On 10 July 2014, no less than 
111 (!!) NGOs – 30 of which were EU organisations and 78 US – wrote a letter to top TTIP negotiators 
Michael Froman and Karel De Gucht, with an annex spelling out seven types of concerns. A return letter 
from Commissioner De Gucht dated 2 October 2014, firmly dismissed all seven concerns in clear terms. 
For reasons that are hard to understand, however, this clear rebuttal seems almost irrelevant for (at 
least) some NGOs, because statements of doubt and fear are still reiterated. Just one more recent 
example is BUND (2015). It would take a separate paper to try to understand this NGO’s tendency to 
make long-rejected allegations on TTIP all the time. One wonders, for instance, whether European 
NGOs and some sceptical MEPs do not believe that the European Commission is capable of sticking to 
the levels of protection in the TTIP negotiations and would not be lured into ‘issue linkages’ or trade-
offs on this question.  
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ambitious goals for the chemicals sector, but in the final analysis, we conclude that the two 
sides cannot yet agree on what constitutes ‘up’: European governments, industry trade 
associations and the general public generally perceive their recently-enacted Regulation on 
registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemicals (REACH) as providing 
better protection than does the US system,3 as also do some US academics and NGOs. US 
companies and negotiators, however, are loathe to adopt the REACH system, which they 
perceive as being overly ‘precautionary’ and unduly burdensome.4 This problem of divergent 
perceptions of the effectiveness of the other sides’ regulatory system is not limited to 
chemicals. These perceptions (or misperceptions) are inverted for other sectors: some 
Americans perceive European regulation of automobiles as ‘weaker’ than theirs,5 and they, 
like Europeans regarding chemicals, are so far unwilling to ‘roll back’ existing protections in 
order to strike a trade deal. 
These perceptions are probably at least in part caricatures. The most amazing are the 
perceptions of some (mostly European) NGOs and indeed citizens (e.g. in social media and in 
advocacy activities) about how Americans seem to live with woefully inadequate protection 
against risky chemicals. The caricature amounts to the notion that Americans are swimming 
in a toxic soup of dangerous chemicals every day! Few if any in Europe appear to have second 
thoughts about such caricatures, as if American citizens and workers would easily accept such 
a predicament, as if liability would not undo this at least in part, as if many other laws than 
TSCA do not exist (which actually have the effect of regulating many substances). If it were so 
bad, have Americans (and especially workers) contracted many diseases associated with such 
unregulated risky chemicals to an extent not found6 in Europe? The surprising fact remains 
that there is very little objective data that would allow a neutral observer to assess whether it 
                                                   
3 Of course, it will be remembered that the enactment of the REACH Regulation late in 2006 took place 
amidst enormous controversy. Now that REACH is EU law, there seems little point in continuing the 
debate, but this does not mean that REACH is well accepted. What is accepted are the objectives of 
REACH, much less (or rejected) the high costs.  
4 As this paper goes to press, long-pending legislation in the US Congress to adopt a somewhat more 
‘REACH-like’ system of national chemical regulation has cleared some important hurdles but still faces 
others (Kollipara, 2015). TSCA Reform has been passed by the House, and it now seems that the US 
Senate may pass it in early August, and a merged version of the two (House and Senate bills) might 
well go to the US President for signature in September 2015. Even if TSCA reform is eventually enacted, 
it will take many years to be implemented through regulations and enforcement and to gain credibility 
in Europe. 
5 See Brad Berman, “Lusting for Europe's Illegal 60-MPG Cars”, 8 December 2008 
(www.hybridcars.com/lusting-europe-illegal-high-mpg-cars-25323/). 
6 There are some instances where a substance, prohibited in the EU, may cause adverse health effects in 
the US, e.g. electronic devices with nickel in their cases, but is this product-specific or a general pattern? 
And are people actually being exposed to the nickel? Europe often regulates based on ‘hazard’, the 
presence of a potentially toxic substance, whereas the US tends to consider ‘risk’, which also weighs in 
the balance exposure and the seriousness of the harm. The seriousness of the adverse health effect might 
also be weighed in considering whether a ban or some other form of regulation such as a notice to 
susceptible populations makes sense. In the case of nickel in electronic devices, the main adverse health 
effect seems to be a skin rash in a small proportion of the population who are allergic to nickel. One 
proposed solution is to cover the nickel with a case or a lacquer to avoid skin contact (see Rita Arrup, 
“Electronic Devices and Nickel Allergic Reactions”, Nickel Allergy Information News and Solutions, 14 
July 2014 (www.nickelallergyinformation.com/2014/07/electronic_devices_and_nickel.htm).  
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is so bad in the US, or, more generally, which side is ‘right’. In addition, the actual situation 
may be a mixed bag, in which one side regulates more stringently in some areas, and the other 
more stringently in others. The fact is we just don’t know, although this is rarely 
acknowledged. Most of the literature comparing the two regimes7 is anecdotal and evidently 
not sufficient to persuade governments and their publics that the differences in actual 
outcomes are not as great as they are often perceived to be. That in itself is a puzzle: those who 
think the world is efficient would predict that both sides would invest in developing better 
information about how the two systems of chemicals regulation actually function so that they 
could make rational decisions for their mutual benefit. 
That the two largest trading blocs are making important decisions about one of their largest 
market segments without good data about how chemicals regulation actually works (in terms 
of what is regulated and how well for SHEC protection) on the two sides of the Atlantic 
suggests there may well be something to a tradition older than rational actor models such as 
Vogel’s. This alternative vision of how human beings behave emphasises the role of error and 
misperception, in addition to rational calculation in human affairs, and it is now experiencing 
a rebirth under the rubric ‘behavioral law and economics’.8 Its essence is aptly captured in 
former Israeli foreign minister Abba Eban’s line: “History teaches us that men and nations 
behave wisely once they have exhausted all other alternatives.”9  
The assumption that people are often guided by errors and misperceptions10 leads us to 
conclude that the negotiators on both sides of the Atlantic may not be unwise in setting modest 
goals after all. Greater harmonisation of chemical regulatory systems across the Atlantic may 
be premature. We may have to go through a period of mutual confidence-building to 
overcome the stereotypes and misperceptions that currently limit progress; in Abba Eban’s 
words, we have to “exhaust all the other alternatives” before we can move to a more rational, 
more efficient system that would benefit both sides by eliminating needless duplication and 
inconsistency. The negotiators appear to be setting only modest goals to promote greater data-
sharing and collaboration at the technical level. This might eventually lead both sides to 
greater convergence in regulatory outcomes and to increasing the perception that the actual 
substantive results of the two systems of chemical regulation in many areas are not that 
different, despite major differences in legal structure and procedure. 
Our assessment of the current situation leads us to make two practical recommendations, 
which will be elaborated later in this paper. 
1) Optional asymmetric harmonisation. We recommend that the TTIP should include an optional 
process for ‘harmonising up’ by gradually voluntarily opting into what are perceived to be 
more stringent regulations on one side or the other. This would be achieved by maintaining 
                                                   
7 The best work comparing risk regulation in the US and the EU concludes there is actually very little 
difference, but one sector or another may be more ‘precautionary’ on one side or the other (see Renn & 
Elliott, 2011). Most of the literature comparing TSCA and REACH focuses on the procedural and 
systemic aspects, often with a view to reforming TSCA. Examples include GAO (2007) and Applegate 
(2008).  
8 See Thaler & Sunstein (2008). 
9 Speech delivered in London, 16 December 1970, as quoted in The Times [London], 17 December 1970 
and in Great Jewish Quotations (1996) by Alfred J. Kolatch, p. 115 
(http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Abba_Eban).  
10 See generally Kahneman (2011). 
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an official list of regulations that are deemed to be more stringent by both sides and allowing 
companies to opt in to be governed by the concededly more stringent rules. This option would 
promote efficiency by eliminating duplication where the benefits of eliminating duplicative 
regulation are greater than the costs of over-compliance. Opting in to more stringent 
regulation where the costs of doing so are low also may begin a bottom-up process of creating 
de facto internationally harmonised regulations worldwide. 
2) Ongoing expert assessment of comparative effectiveness of regulation. We also recommend that 
the TTIP should include a new institution for developing mutually credible assessments and 
data about the actual performance of chemicals regulation on both sides of the Atlantic. Future 
negotiators should not be working from the stereotypes and caricatures that currently define 
mutual misperceptions of the other’s system of chemicals regulation. Joint panels of experts 
should be convened to assess and report on where actual regulatory outcomes differ and 
where they are either ‘essentially equivalent’ or at least good enough to protect the public as 
intended. 
An interesting model for such an institution was recently provided by the automobile 
industry. The European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association, the American Automotive 
Policy Council and the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers together commissioned a recent 
study by two leading engineering think tanks, one American – the University of Michigan 
Transportation Research Institute – and one European – SAFER, a transportation research 
centre at Chalmers University in Gothenburg, Sweden – to evaluate whether motor vehicles 
manufactured in compliance with EU and US regulatory requirements provide essentially 
equivalent real-world safety performance.11 Although one might debate whether ‘essential (or 
functional) equivalence’, as opposed to ‘adequate to protect the public’,12 is the right standard 
for evaluation, the model of neutral evaluation by experts on both sides of the Atlantic is a 
promising one. We recommend that something like this should be embodied in a permanent 
institution under TTIP, which would be mandated to carry out comparative studies of the 
effectiveness of regulation in the two trading partners and make consensus recommendations 
for areas where greater harmonisation would not reduce the practical level of protection on 
either side.13 
                                                   
11 See European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association Press Release, “TTIP: Study examines EU & 
US vehicle safety equivalence”, 21 May 2014 (www.acea.be/press-releases/article/ttip-study-
examines-eu-us-vehicle-safety-equivalence). The results of this highly technical study were not yet 
available when the present paper went to press. However, the European Commission published two 
practical examples of testing for equivalence, one on seat belt anchorages and one on lighting and vision 
standards, both of which were found functionally equivalent, despite diverging technical requirements. 
See http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153023.pdf and 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/february/tradoc_153168.pdf  
12 See US Administrative Conference Recommendation 2011-6 on International Regulatory Cooperation, 
Paragraph 4, adopted 8 December 2011: “To deploy limited resources more effectively, agencies should, 
where appropriate and practicable, identify foreign authorities that maintain high quality and effective 
standards and practices and identify areas in which the tests, inspections, or certifications by agencies 
and such foreign agencies overlap.” (www.acus.gov/recommendation/international-regulatory-
cooperation) 
13 For an analysis of the political economy of recommendations by expert consensus bodies, and why 
they are often adopted by politicians without controversy, see Elliott (2008).  
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3. Why did so much effort and prospective gains produce so little?  
Why did so much effort produce so little convergence of regulatory systems is the over-riding 
question about the TTIP negotiations for the chemicals sector. In fact, a lot of effort in chemicals 
preceded the TTIP negotiations under the Transatlantic Market Place since 1996 and the 
proposals of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD). As we shall remind the reader, the 
common chemical TABD proposals of one and a half decades ago were much bolder than what 
is on the table in TTIP. In chemicals, TTIP as it stands today, is anything but bold. Although 
the terms of a final agreement are still to be agreed, the negotiators (particularly those for the 
EU) have taken pains in public statements to reassure an anxious public and NGO community 
that “joint chemicals regulation is absolutely off the table”.14 As reported in ENDS Europe 
DAILY, “both [US chief negotiator Dan] Mullaney and the EU’s [chief negotiator Ignacio] 
Garcia Bercero emphasised that they are not considering ‘harmonising or mutually 
recognising’ the two regulatory systems.”15 Of course, some two decades ago, REACH did not 
exist. One can argue with some justification that the emergence of REACH itself has killed the 
ambitious proposals emerging from the TABD. However (as far as we know), no alternative 
approaches have been suggested by the negotiators to reduce significantly technical barriers 
to trade (TBTs) in chemicals trade, without reducing SHEC -protection on either side. Looking 
at the EU negotiation position on chemicals,16 the proposals are modest and will hardly 
address the high costs of TBTs in the sector.  
And it is lowering TBTs that is the prime economic justification of TTIP. The present paper is 
not the right place to elaborate on TBTs in chemicals trade. The most respectable study on the 
overall costs of TBTs and their partial removal under TTIP is Francois et al. (2013) for the 
Commission’s Impact Assessment. A non-technical assessment of the study and alternatives 
can be found in Pelkmans et al. (2014) for the European Parliament. The simulations by 
Francois et al. are the only ones with specific sectoral TBT estimates: for chemicals, TBT costs 
of EU exports to the US amount to 19.1%; for US exports to the EU, some 13.6%. These compare 
with chemical tariffs in the 3%-6% range, with quite a few actually being zero. This is not to 
suggest that these TBT estimates are rock-solid – it is exceedingly difficult to come to such 
estimates (which is why sectoral TBT estimates are so very rare). Moreover, in discussions with 
the chemicals industry, it was indicated that TBTs due to regulatory (systems) divergence are 
costly, no doubt, and should be reduced significantly, but these fairly high costs are not seen 
as a true trade barrier by the larger chemicals firms, only by the many SMEs. Still, going by 
the best study available (Francois et al., 2013), a halving of the TBT costs in chemicals would 
give a boost in mutual exports of respectively €29.9 billion (36%) for the EU and €27.3 billion 
(34%) for the US, which are impressive statistics by any account. It ought to be noted that these 
effects incorporate general equilibrium effects (e.g. also of other TTIP sectors and their 
relations with the chemical industry) and, moreover, are calculated on the assumption of 
positive spill-overs to third countries.17 However, if SMEs would find it feasible, once TTIP 
                                                   
14 “Shared Chemicals Assessment on TTIP Table”, ENDS Europe DAILY, 3 October 2014. 
15 Ibid. 
16 See the EU’s position on chemicals on the European Commission’s website 
(http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/may/tradoc_152468.pdf).  
17 A spill-over of 20% has been assumed. This also has a positive effect on EU and US exports of 
chemicals to the rest of the world, up by some 9%. It is also good to re-emphasise that TBTs have nothing 
to do with SHEC objectives (or , the ‘level of protection’). TTIP discussions painfully demonstrate that 
many commentators are hardly or not at all aware of the WTO TBT agreement, which assumes SHEC 
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would have reduced TBTs significantly, to enter transatlantic trade, the economic effects 
would become larger still. This SME effect cannot be modelled in CGE approaches. Thus, the 
case for tackling TBTs in chemicals in TTIP is powerful.  
This is not to say, however, that a TTIP agreement on chemicals, without lowering TBTs 
significantly at first, would be unimportant. An agreement, if one is eventually reached, will 
undoubtedly result in progress towards reducing certain trade barriers, including the 
elimination of (relatively low) tariffs on chemicals, as well as increased collaboration at the 
scientific and technical level and probably also to greater standardisation of testing methods, 
labelling and sharing of datasets. According to reports in the trade press, “EU and US 
negotiators are examining how regulators can share the work of assessing priority chemicals 
as part of the TTIP trade deal ….”18 These could lead to substantial accomplishments. 
Moreover, eliminating tariffs alone is estimated to save €1.5 billion annually,19 and this tariff-
cutting would also avoid distorting trade by deterring transactions that might otherwise occur 
in their absence.20 Greater collaboration and familiarity at the scientific level may eventually 
lead to building greater confidence in one another’s regulatory approaches and that in turn 
could lead to further progress to reduce regulatory differences.21  
4. Two decades lost? Missed opportunities for harmonisation? 
Proponents of regulatory convergence in the chemical sector had higher hopes22 when the US 
and the EU announced that chemicals regulation would be a focus of the TTIP negotiations. 
TTIP came on the heels of nearly two decades of attempts to reduce the costs of mutual market 
access in chemicals through the Transatlantic Business Dialogue, as well as increased 
regulatory cooperation between the European Commission and the US Environmental 
Protection Agency,23 and also broad-based efforts to harmonise chemical regulatory systems 
                                                   
objectives of national governments as given. It is all about instruments or red tape or avoidable 
duplications of tests, etc.  
18 ENDS Europe DAILY (3 October 2014). See also Box 2.  
19 “US-EU trade pact can cut import duties on €48 billion in chemical trade: Cefic”, Platts, 18 June 2013 
(www.platts.com/latest-news/petrochemicals/london/us-eu-trade-pact-can-cut-import-duties-on-
eur48-26030822). 
20 One study (Erixon & Bauer, 2010) estimates that eliminating tariffs on all products would boost EU 
exports by 7% and US exports by 8%. See also the comments of E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company 
(2013): “Elimination of the remaining import duties on chemicals, currently averaging between 3-6%, 
would result in considerable savings to our company and remove many economic barriers to shipping 
technical and chemical intermediates.”. Francois et al. (2013) estimate that tariff removal only would 
boost EU chemical exports to the US by 5.4%; for US exports, it is no less than 12.4% (again, under the 
assumption of a 20% spill-over to 3rd countries).  
21 Remarks of Jim Jones, Acting Assistant Administrator for the Office of Chemicals Safety and Pollution 
Prevention, US Environmental Protection Agency, “Towards a Transatlantic Market for Trade in 
Chemicals”, 17 July2013, Washington, D.C.  
22 See remarks e.g. of Stuart E. Eizenstat (2013) in E!Sharp: “In fact, we should have confidence in the 21st 
century that the regulatory standards in both the EU and US are adequate to protect our publics and 
should be accepted, … Mutual recognition is a sounder basis for regulatory cooperation than actual 
harmonization.” 
23 For summaries of these precursors, see Quick (2007) and Shaffer & Pollack (2005, pp. 220-221). 
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in developed countries more generally through the OECD.24 The rationale behind all these 
efforts to reduce regulatory divergences was succinctly summarised in a 2008 Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) report to the US Congress: 
Since the mid-1990s, both US and European multinational companies have viewed 
divergent ways of regulating markets for both goods and services as the most serious 
barriers to transatlantic commerce. The primary reason why these companies seek to 
achieve greater harmonization in standards and regulatory procedures is to reduce 
costs imposed by complying with two different sets of regulations and standards.25 
The CRS report went on to opine: “Redundant standards, testing, and certification procedures 
are seen by [multinational] companies as far more costly and harmful than any trade barriers 
imposed at the border, such as tariffs or quotas” and that “[i]n no area has [regulatory 
divergence] been a greater problem than in chemicals”.26 
Hopes for progress on regulatory convergence received a boost in May 2012, when President 
Obama signed Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory Cooperation,27 
which declared the following as official US policy: 
In some cases, the differences between the regulatory approaches of US agencies and 
those of their foreign counterparts might not be necessary and might impair the ability 
of American businesses to export and compete internationally. In meeting shared 
challenges involving health, safety, labor, security, environmental, and other issues, 
international regulatory cooperation can identify approaches that are at least as 
protective as those that are or would be adopted in the absence of such cooperation. 
International regulatory cooperation can also reduce, eliminate, or prevent 
unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements.28 
Nevertheless, it is useful to recall that chemical regulatory cooperation was agreed to be 
reinforced following the New Transatlantic Marketplace in Madrid in 1995. As the survey by 
Quick (2007) describes in painstaking detail, joint US-EU business proposals by TABD were 
made, some of which were innovative. One might even call them bold! Without rehearsing the 
history in all its aspects, already in 1996 in Chicago, proposals were launched to follow up the 
OECD GLP and MAD agreements (see Box 1 in section 5 ) and negotiate Conditional 
Equivalence Agreements in a) risk assessment, b) notification of new chemicals, c) application 
and use and d) classification and labelling. Interestingly, the end point would be 
‘unconditional equivalence agreements’ by 2000! Knowing that harmonisation was pointless, 
the TABD made a strong plea for forms of mutual recognition or acceptance as feasible 
alternatives. For instance, enhancing understanding and acceptance of methods used for 
hazard assessment and risk assessment was seen as a priority; exceptions for low-risk 
                                                   
24 For example, see Box 1 and OECD Guidelines for the Testing of Chemicals 
(www.oecd.org/env/ehs/testing/oecdguidelinesforthetestingofchemicals.htm).  
25 Raymond J. Ahearn, “Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation and Analysis: Background and 
Analysis”, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 22 October 2008 
(http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/112019.pdf).  
26 Ibid., pp. 2-3. This is consistent with the economic study conducted by Francois et al. (2013) for the 
Commission’s Impact Assessment of TTIP, finding that the costs of chemical TBTs are the second-
highest (after automotive).  
27 www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201200327/pdf/DCPD-201200327.pdf  
28 Executive Order 13609, §1. 
10  ELLIOTT & PELKMANS 
 
chemicals, polymers and R&D chemicals were favoured when registering new chemicals 
substances (to be fair, these suggestions were later echoed in REACH to some degree). For 
new polymers, an equivalence agreement (like mutual recognition) was proposed: once 
allowed to be sold in the US (EU), it could also be marketed in the EU (US). But Quick (2007, 
p. 255), complains that the “biggest obstacle to progress is the lack of understanding among 
the authorities concerning the other regulatory system”. And, not to forget, REACH was in the 
early preparatory stages, which undoubtedly widened systemic divergence.29 
While misunderstanding of one another’s systems is certainly an important factor, we also 
suggest an additional reason: the perception by key players that Atlantic regulatory 
cooperation is but an interim step towards developing chemical regulatory systems 
worldwide. Since REACH was proposed in 2003, if not before with the Chemicals White Paper 
in 2001 proposing the precautionary principle, Atlantic regulatory cooperation was throttled, 
if not in coma (except for very specific practical issues, case by case). Staking out positions for 
this larger game of defining the rules for trade in chemicals worldwide was more important 
to participants on both sides than the immediate gains that could be made by reducing 
differences in regulatory systems between the US and the EU. 
However, other factors also contributed to the failure of chemical regulatory cooperation 
between the EU and the US, including the politics of chemical regulation. As a practical, 
political matter in the current environment, making changes to REACH in Europe would have 
been extremely difficult and reform of TSCA has long been stalled in Congress. As this paper 
goes to press, there is renewed hope that a bipartisan compromise may finally be reached in 
Congress to overhaul the outdated US Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), first enacted in 
1976 and not significantly amended in the ensuing 40 years. However, from the EU end, the 
proposed changes are regarded as incremental: easier to regulate ‘restrictions’ but no 
comprehensive requirement for ‘registration’ (testing) of all chemicals before bringing them to 
the market 30 and no ‘authorisations’ regime for SVHCs on a company basis, and hence, only 
a little bit more ‘REACH-like’.31 
There is a broad consensus in Europe and among academics in the United States that Section 
6 of TSCA, which gives EPA authority to regulate chemicals analogous to ‘restriction’ under 
REACH, is currently ineffective. However, it is not always appreciated, particularly in Europe, 
that TSCA Section 6 is by its terms only one tool available to the federal and state governments 
in the US to regulate chemicals; indeed, by law EPA is supposed to regulate under (many) 
other statutes than TSCA if it can. 32 Thus, the TSCA-REACH comparison is far from a 
                                                   
29 See Pelkmans (2005). 
30 This should not be misread: for new chemicals, a PMN (= pre-manufacture notification) is required, 
but testing is not necessarily comprehensive (and not standardised a priori, as in REACH), dependingt 
e.g. on whether the substance is very similar to other ones known to be safe. Around one-third of the 
chemicals, for which a PMN is submitted, are not approved. For existing chemicals, no registration or 
testing is required and the burden of proof is on the EPA; here, the gap with REACH is wide.  
31 See Kollipara (2015).  
32 TSCA Sec 6, which is similar to ‘restrictions’ under REACH, only applies if the EPA lacks authority to 
address the risk under another statute. This limitation is explicit in the statutory language: 
If the Administrator [of EPA] determines that a risk of injury to health or the environment 
could be eliminated or reduced to a sufficient extent by actions taken under another Federal 
law (or laws) administered in whole or in part by the Administrator, the Administrator may 
not promulgate a rule under subsection (a) to protect against such risk of injury unless the 
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complete comparison of the effectiveness of chemical regulation as a whole. For this reason, 
Box 1 provides a primer on how the US regulates chemicals, as this seems too little known in 
Europe, and perhaps even in the US.  
Box 1. A primer on how the US regulates chemicals 
The US system for regulating chemical exposures is much more complex and multi-faceted than 
the one followed in Europe. This complexity is not necessarily desirable but instead reflects 
aspects of the US constitutional system and the incentives for US politicians to pass new laws for 
which they can claim credit rather than to amend or codify old ones.33 In addition, US legal 
culture and traditions are more skeptical of government, resulting in the construction of 
multiple, redundant programmes.34 The multiplicity of US laws and institutions does mean, 
however, that a simple-minded comparison between TSCA and REACH is misleading. TSCA is 
merely a last line of defence; by law, TSCA Section 6 authority can only be used if regulation 
under another statute would not be effective.35  
Numerous other statutory authorities and common law principles would have to be considered 
in order to assess the overall effectiveness of chemical regulation in the US versus Europe, and 
                                                   
Administrator finds, in the Administrator’s discretion, that it is in the public interest to protect 
against such risk under this Act. In making such a finding the Administrator shall consider (i) 
all relevant aspects of the risk, as determined by the Administrator in the Administrator’s 
discretion, (ii) a comparison of the estimated costs of complying with actions taken under this 
Act and under such law (or laws), and (iii) the relative efficiency of actions under this Act and 
under such law (or laws) to protect against such risk of injury. 
15 USC. §2605(c), http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/2605  
The EPA has generally found that addressing particular uses of a substance, e.g. in pesticides, foods, 
consumer products or releases to water, etc., is more effective than addressing it across the board under 
TSCA.  
33 For an account of ‘competitive credit claiming’ by politicians in creating US environmental laws, see 
Elliott, Ackerman & Millian (1985). 
34 This fundamental difference between the prevailing legal strategies in Europe and the US was noted 
by the sagacious European observer Walter Bagehot (1901) over a century ago: “The English 
constitution, in a word, is framed on the principle of choosing a single sovereign authority, and making 
it good; the American, upon the principle of having many sovereign authorities, and hoping that their 
multitude will atone for their inferiority.” 
35 TSCA Sec 6, which is somewhat similar to banning or ‘restriction’ for particular uses under REACH, 
only applies if EPA lacks authority to address the risk under another statute. This limitation is explicit 
in the statutory language. If the Administrator [of EPA] determines that a risk of injury to health or the 
environment could be eliminated or reduced to a sufficient extent by actions taken under another 
Federal law (or laws) administered in whole or in part by the Administrator, the Administrator may not 
promulgate a rule under subsection a) to protect against such risk of injury unless the Administrator 
finds, in the Administrator’s discretion, that it is in the public interest to protect against such risk under 
this Act. In making such a finding the Administrator shall consider: i) all relevant aspects of the risk, as 
determined by the Administrator in the Administrator’s discretion, ii) a comparison of the estimated 
costs of complying with actions taken under this Act and under such law (or laws) and iii) the relative 
efficiency of actions under this Act and under such law (or laws) to protect against such risk of injury. 
See 15 C. §2605(c) www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/2605 and 
www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/7416.  
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so far as we are aware, this has never been done.36 For example, the standard West Publishing 
Company pamphlet of Federal Environmental Statutes lists 59 federal environmental laws 
alphabetically from the Acid Precipitation Act of 1980 through the Wood Residue Utilization Act 
of 1980, running to a total of 1,842 pages of small, 10-point type. About half of them apply to 
chemicals in various contexts. Add to these the administrative regulations in the Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR) which are much more voluminous and detailed than the statutes themselves 
and the laws of the 50 states, which are generally allowed to add legal restrictions in addition to 
the federal ones in most fields.37 And in addition, there are many other federal laws that regulate 
chemicals in various contexts that Americans do not consider ‘environmental’. For example, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)38 regulates permissible exposure limits (PELs) for 
several hundred chemicals in the workplace.39 Under the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has promulgated several short lists of chemical 
additives that are permitted for use in cosmetics, medicines and foods but bans all others unless 
they obtain special approval on a case-by-case basis based on test data.40 The Consumer Product 
Safety Act (CPSA) regulates toxics in articles to which consumers may be exposed such as toys.41  
Thus, the frequently quoted nostrum that REACH regulates ‘articles’ but TSCA does not, while 
literally true, is inherently misleading; TSCA does not regulate chemical usage in articles, but 
another federal statute does. Finally, one should not forget that the US is a common-law country. 
One of the reasons that TSCA has not been amended in 40 years is that many adaptations have 
been accomplished by judicial and administrative interpretation and practice, without ever 
codifying them in changes of the statute. Thus, the ‘endangered species act’ was converted from 
a statute protecting individual animals into one that protects biodiversity and critical habitat, 
without ever modifying the words of the statute. A somewhat analoguous example of adaptation 
by administrative interpretation is the EPA’s standard ‘consent decree’ for new chemicals (which 
comes closer to specific ‘authorisation’ under REACH) that a company agrees to restrict 
production, distribution and disposal of a new – presumably risky - substance until more 
knowledge becomes available.42 Its application is quite different from what the statute’s drafters 
originally contemplated.  
Yet another very different example is POPs (Persistent Organic Pollutants), which are chemical 
substances that persist in the environment, bioaccumulate through the food web and pose a risk 
of causing adverse effects to human health and the environment. Although the US signed, but 
never ratified, the Stockholm Convention, POPs are forbidden in the US in domestic legislation. 
                                                   
36 In the 1990s, one of the co-authors published a 97-page chapter in a treatise merely cataloguing the 
various federal environmental laws affecting the chemical industry, but did not purport to assess their 
effectiveness (see Elliott & Thomas, 1993). 
37 See e.g. Clean Air Act, §116, 42 U.S.C. §7416. 
38 29 U.S.C. ch. 15 § 651 et seq. 
39 See 29 CFR 1910.1000, Tables Z-1, Z-2 and Z-3 
(www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=9992).  
40 21 CFR Parts 73, 74, 81 and 82 
(www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/ColorAdditives/ColorAdditiveInventories/ucm115641.htm).  
41 See Ed Loewenton, “CPSC Toughens Lead Regulations in Toys”, 28 October 2008, describing 
provisions of the US Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, §101 
(http://turnertoys.com/CPSC-Toughens-Lead-Regulations-in-Toys.html). 
42 See Renn & Elliott (2011, p. 237) describing “EPA’s standard consent decree [under TSCA §5], which 
allows limited production and use of substances in specified uses with limited potential to cause harm 
while further information is developed”. 
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In summary, the legal systems in the US and Europe are very different in their structure, which 
makes comprehensive comparisons difficult, but one thing is sure: counting the number of 
chemicals banned under REACH versus the number banned under TSCA is not an accurate 
measure of their differences.  
 
One paper found that only a few substances had been regulated under TSCA, but conceded 
that at least 1,134 chemicals had been regulated under other US statutes as of 2011 
(Schwarzman & Wilson, 2011, p. 109, Table 5.1).. These statistics are old,43 however, and do not 
even include de facto restrictive or chilling effects caused by tough US liability cases or 
voluntary withdrawals under EPA pressure. Schwarzman and Wilson went on to declare 
TSCA’s ineffectiveness had created a ‘data gap’ and a ‘safety gap’ between the US and Europe. 
It is easy to count how many substances have been regulated under TSCA. It is much more 
difficult to assess the overall effectiveness of the US chemical control programme44 and 
incentives created by common-law liability cases (see Box 1). In other words, there seems to 
be no ready, comprehensive and accessible information about the extent and level of 
protection against risky chemicals in the US, a remarkable circumstance to say the least.  
There is very little literature comparing the actual breadth and stringency of regulation of 
chemicals in the US versus Europe on a systematic basis. There is, however, a widespread 
perception that REACH is more effective than TSCA and even if Congress ultimately does 
strengthen TSCA, it will require many years of implementation to build confidence in Europe 
that US regulation of chemicals is comparable to that in Europe. 
The perceived differences between the effectiveness of regulation under TSCA and REACH 
may have been uppermost in the minds of the industry and the negotiators when drafting 
TTIP negotiation positions and we do not wish to be misperceived as discounting the 
importance of this factor. But in the long run, describing the politics of chemical regulation in 
the US and the EU at a particular point in time is less important than understanding the 
dynamics of bilateral trade negotiations in the new era of globalisation of trade, and it is on 
that larger lesson that we focus. 
5. Setting modest goals for TTIP 
5.1 The joint position of the chemical industry and EU suggestions 
Despite high hopes for greater regulatory convergence in the run-up to TTIP, substantive 
changes to the divergent regulatory systems for regulating chemicals on the two sides of the 
Atlantic were taken off the table even before the TTIP talks began, according to the position of 
the European negotiators that were leaked early in the process: 
                                                   
43 Note that Table 5.1 is based on rather old evidence by Dernbach (1997).  
44 Schwarzman & Wilson (2011) mention five such statutes: Clean Water Act, Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act, Clean Air Act, Occupational Health and Safety Act and the Toxics Release Inventory 
of the Community Right-to-Know Act. As noted in Box 1, this is a painfully incomplete view of chemical 
protection in the US. At the same time, both the EU and the US have a lot of product-specific regulation 
of chemicals; in other words, also for the EU, there is much more than REACH (e.g. hazardous chemicals 
in electronic goods, end-of-life-vehicles, POPs, toys, food contact materials, etc.) A survey of 155 pieces 
of EU legislation, outside REACH, which may affect chemicals is in Milieu (2012). 
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Industry associations, civil society and governments are aware that neither full 
harmonisation nor mutual recognition seems feasible on the basis of the existing 
framework legislations in the US and EU: REACH (Regulation (EC) 1907/2006) and 
TSCA (Toxic Substances Control Act) are too different with regard to some 
fundamental principles. 
The recently completed REACH Review concluded that REACH should not be 
amended, while in the US a bipartisan proposal to amend TSCA has been introduced 
into Congress in May 2013. 
However, the draft TSCA reform legislation does not foresee any general registration 
obligation for substances as a condition for their marketing (a fundamental 
requirement under REACH), nor elements comparable to authorisation, while it 
would give the EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) new and easier possibilities 
to conduct chemical assessments and adopt risk management measures such as 
restrictions.45 
This positioning rings true because, remarkably, the trade associations representing the 
chemicals industry on both sides of the Atlantic proposed a limited (joint) agenda that did not 
include making progress towards reducing non-tariff trade barriers in the form of duplicative 
regulatory reviews. A joint paper drafted by the European Chemical Industry Council 
(CEFIC), “with the cooperation of ACC,” the American Chemistry Council representing the 
US chemical industry, outlined very limited “joint ACC-CEFIC proposals for enhanced 
cooperation in chemicals”: 
 Common prioritisation principles and burden-sharing for assessments of high-priority 
chemicals and, where appropriate, categories of substances (e.g. substance evaluation 
under REACH and high-priority targeted risk assessments under the current TSCA and 
safety determinations under a modernised TSCA). 
 Recognition of each other’s data and studies and harmonised standards and 
methodologies for hazard and risk assessment are necessary for effective burden-sharing.46 
 
The chemical industry’s joint position was that: 
Closer cooperation on prioritisation of substances for further assessment would lead 
to cost reductions for both authorities and companies by creating opportunities for 
burden-sharing. That would also contribute to narrowing the difference in outcomes 
of assessments by fostering coherence and building confidence in each other’s 
assessments. In the long run that could also result in greater coherence in regulatory outcomes 
including down-stream legislation which would further reduce regulatory divergence.47 
                                                   
45 These quotations are literally found in the EU’s position on chemicals, published a little later on the 
European Commission’s website 
(http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/may/tradoc_152468.pdf). 
46 See CEFIC’s response to the European Commission’s request for further details on joint ACC-CEFIC 
proposals for enhanced cooperation on chemicals under TTIP, 7 March 2014 (www.cefic.org/ 
Documents/PolicyCentre/TTIP/%5bTTIP%5d%20Cefic%20response%20to%20Commission%20ACC-
efic%20proposal%20on%20TTIP%207%20March%202014%20(web%20and%20click-in).pdf).  
47 Ibid. (emphasis supplied). 
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Box 2. OECD accomplishments in chemicals regulatory cooperation 
The OECD is usually regarded as fostering policy research in many domains, ensuring the 
quality of statistical series and economic studies in many fields and stimulating a wide range of 
cooperative and exchange activities amongst policy-makers. But it is not typically referred to as 
an agenda-setter or rule-maker. Yet, that is exactly what it has accomplished in chemicals, after 
decades of low-key technical work. Interestingly, the US and the EU have been leading in this 
work. When discussing regulatory convergence in chemicals over the North Atlantic, and even 
more so when suggesting that a gradual move to a common minimum of world regulatory 
requirements and methods in chemical risk management is so important for the EU and the US, 
one should first be aware of the achievements by the OECD. Alternatively, when assessing the 
current ideas of the negotiators in TTIP or, for that matter, of the chemical industry in their joint 
paper, the accomplishments of the OECD so far prompt the query: What value-added can the 
TTIP proposals really bring beyond the results of the OECD, quite apart from other – indeed 
higher - ambitions on chemical cooperation? 
The OECD has generated three significant accomplishments. The most important one is the 
MAD system (MAD = Mutual Acceptance of Data). This is a binding agreement for member states 
based on an OECD Council Act from 1981.* The obligation is to accept chemical safety data from 
other OECD countries, plus seven other signatories (e.g. India, Brazil, South Africa, Singapore), 
if and only if these data have been generated using OECD Test Guidelines and OECD Good 
Laboratory Practices (GLP). The objectives of the MAD system is i) to save resources by avoiding 
duplication, ii) reduce NTBs, iii) reduce animal testing by acceptance of earlier testing and iv) 
arrive at a level-playing field for industry in if not beyond the OECD. The second 
accomplishment consists of agenda-setting for and follow-up actions in four types of OECD 
activity, all building on MAD: burden-sharing between countries on actual assessments of 
chemicals, such as the evaluation of safety of high-production-volume (HPV) chemicals; 
harmonisation of industry dossiers for chemicals and review reports for pesticides; exchanging 
technical and policy information; and outreach to non-OECD countries, crucial as the weight of 
chemical output in non-OECD countries rapidly increases. For instance, the ‘guidance 
documents’ for industry dossiers and reviews for pesticides (sometimes called a ‘monograph’) 
formulated ever since 1998 can be found in areas such as biocides, chemical accidents, regulatory 
oversight of biotech, safety of novel food and feed, and manufactured nanomaterials. 
____________  
* There are two other OECD Council texts relevant for MAD. One is a Recommendation in 1989 on a range of 
practical implementation and enforcement issues of GLP. The other is a Decision of 1997 providing a step-wise 
procedure for allowing non-OECD countries to take part. 
Source: Sigman (2013). 
 
Conspicuous by its absence from the chemical industry’s ‘wish list’ is any mention of 
regulatory convergence or recognition of regulatory outcomes on either side. On the contrary, 
according to the chemical industry’s joint position, reducing regulatory divergence will have 
to await downstream legislation, because of differences in current legislation. The joint paper 
continues: 
REACH and TSCA are very different with regard to prioritisation of substances for 
assessment and further risk management actions. Whilst TSCA applies risk-based 
prioritisation, REACH includes prioritisation based on production volume or hazard 
and, in several procedures, risk. 
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There are also substantial differences at later stages of the regulatory process, including 
‘authorisation’ and whether government or the industry has the burden of producing safety 
information. It is interesting, and perhaps significant, however, that the joint industry paper 
emphasises the differences in the front end of the process, setting priorities. One even wonders 
how far beyond the useful but modest OECD chemical programme can TTIP move, with such 
a timid mandate (see Box 3). With the UN GHS being partly adopted inside the US (e.g. by 
OSHA) and the OECD programme working more or less reasonably well, should TTIP not go 
far beyond the mild aspirations of these intergovernmental organisations?  
Box 3. Edging towards a draft text of the chemicals annex, EU suggestions 
Following the EU position on chemicals (May 2014), the Commission published two so-called 
‘non-papers’ in November 2014. In May 2014, it proposed ‘enhanced cooperation’ in four areas: 
i) prioritisation of chemicals for assessment and assessment methodologies; ii) promoting 
alignment in classification and labelling of chemicals, i.e. a full implementation of GHS in the 
US, which is a binding obligation – although without sanctions; iii) new and emerging issues, 
e.g. endocrine disruptors and nanomaterials; and iv) enhanced information-sharing, while 
protecting CBI (confidential business information). All these are useful but low-key approaches 
(in the words of the Commission, they “seek opportunities for cooperation exclusively in specific 
areas which do not require or imply any change in the regulatory systems of each side”). 
However, when no change in the systems and/or objectives is implied, one can do so much more 
to lower TBT costs. One ‘non-paper’ (http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/november/ 
tradoc_152912.pdf) is a first outline of how the Annex on chemicals in TTIP would look like. It 
repeats most of what is in the Position Paper, but adds a series of objectives, which do include 
(for the ‘living agreement’, one supposes) i) to “avoid unnecessary duplicative requirements” 
and ii) “to identify and implement actions that can lead to reduction of unnecessary costs to 
transatlantic trade”. Thus, in the longer run, a reduction of TBTs remains possible within the 
living agreement of TTIP.  
Also, a Chemicals Working Group would be established, consisting of regulators. The second 
‘non-paper’ (http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/november/tradoc_152913.pdf) 
provides considerable practical detail on six areas of cooperation and how the US (usually, EPA) 
would be involved, step by step, in notice & comments and information (with an explicit call on 
the US to draft a similar non-paper for three of the six areas). These areas are: prioritisation of 
chemicals, i.e. updates of CoRAP under REACH, process for harmonised classification and 
labelling (which is already a UN standard, called GHS, but implemented in the US only by 
OSHA, so far; call on the US to develop a similar scheme for their NTP activities), nomination of 
SVHCs (very risky chemicals) for the candidate list of authorisation, prioritisation of SVHCs to 
be moved from candidate list to authorisation (Annex XIV REACH), involving the US when a 
restriction proposal (by ECHA or a member state) is listed in the Registry of Intent, and finally 
when companies (or consortia) submit applications for authorisation (e.g. link with alternatives 
based on EPA’s Design for Environment Program).  
These options cannot be belittled: no less than 22 different steps involving the US are identified 
for the six areas, implying numerous consultations, exchanges, comments and follow-ups 
between US and EU regulators. However, in TTIP one would assume the US to offer similar 
options, which would perhaps double the number of optional or obligatory interchanges 
between the two authorities. Where SHEC objectives are not that different over the North 
Atlantic, one should expect that quite often convergence or similar outcomes might finally be 
found. Although all this does not amount to a direct assault on TBTs, it is essential for building 
trust.  
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5.2 Backtracking by the European Parliament: ‘Angst’ or a sound case? 
In July 2015 and without referring to the detailed proposals in Box 3, the European Parliament 
adopted a TTIP resolution which seems to turn against, or at least minimises, the chemicals 
negotiations in TTIP. The rationale of the negative attitude on chemicals is problematic. For 
this reason, we offer some further considerations on the hesitations of some European political 
actors. These considerations, however, are only partially based on public documents, as some 
actors are careful not to go public with their views. Therefore, the authors have weighed the 
drawbacks of relying on informal information obtained from various discussions in the US 
and EU policy circuits, against the benefits for the readers of additional insights about the 
implications of these positions or interests. We have decided that the insights matter more, but 
the reader should judge.  
A good deal of the nervousness or mistrust amongst some EU member state governments as 
well as some political forces in Europe, not to speak of some NGOs, is caused by the conviction 
that the US is suspected to have (hidden) hopes to be able to soften REACH or, seen as more 
likely, exercise ‘regulatory chill’ in the TTIP living agreement in subtle ways for future issues. 
This conviction may be right or wrong – there is no way of verifying48 – but it is prompting a 
fairly defensive stance by the Greens and others in the EP, but also by some EU national 
governments (including, apparently, Germany). Asserting that, in future, TTIP might lead to 
‘regulatory chill’ is a very poor ‘argument’; in fact, it is not really an argument at all, it is a 
conviction driven by mistrust. In numerous trade and regulatory negotiations, all kinds of 
suspicions might be uttered, but should that be a reason not to negotiate?  
More logically, the fear might be a reason to carefully draft agreements and rules, presumably. 
Moreover, what is ‘regulatory chill’ actually? Regulation has to be based on scientific risk 
assessment and subsequently solid impact assessment, as the Guidelines of the Commission 
help to do. If, and only if, risk assessment is not fully possible, as science cannot (yet) establish 
risks with acceptable degrees of probabilities, is there a choice of opting for the application of 
the precautionary principle. Is ‘regulatory chill’ meant to refer to TTIP possibly limiting the 
freedom to exercise this choice? Or is it a concern that joint work on the science might 
eventually persuade Europeans that their present approach is overly precautionary? But that 
is exactly what has to be specified in both horizontal and sectoral TTIP regulatory cooperation. 
Why would that be different for chemicals to such a degree that the EP should be so negative 
about it?  
The present authors have difficulty understanding the logic of this defensive stance. Even if 
‘regulatory chill’ might be regarded as a possibility, why would that be a problem for EU 
negotiators in TTIP now, or, later, in the living agreement? If US suggestions would be made 
having this effect, they would simply be dismissed and this is not new. Discussions with the 
US on REACH have been conducted for a decade or longer, in Brussels, Washington and 
indeed in Geneva (WTO) as well. Why would the Commission suddenly be incapable of 
properly pursuing a well-defined EU mandate or its specific manifestations? Can it be traced 
back to a simmering tension or distrust between those (more?) preoccupied with 
environmenta and health matters and those primarily working on chemicals with industry 
and other chemicals found downstream in value-chains? The ‘angst’ for regulatory chill is 
found frequently amongst advocacy groups in Europe – it is a most convenient plank on which 
                                                   
48 US negotiators or involved officials have been tightlipped and no detailed documents, let alone 
proposals or positions, have been published by US Trade Representative.  
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to campaign but it is purely assertive. It seems to reflect a sentiment that EU regulators and 
negotiators are too ‘malleable’ due to business pressures or simply soft negotiators. Given the 
record of the EU in many FTAs and in EU trade policy more generally, as well as in the 
international debate on REACH (including with the US), there is no rationale whatsoever to 
support this defensiveness.  
Nevertheless, the European Parliament has, in its TTIP resolution of 8 July 2015,49 stipulated 
that negotiators, when it comes to regulatory cooperation, should “recognise that, where the 
EU and the US have very different rules, there will be no agreement, such as on ... REACH and 
its implementation ... and therefore not to negotiate on these issues”. The possible problem of 
this formulation is not that REACH cannot be negiotiated, as noted before: this was always 
clear and explicit, too. The additional words “and its implementation” constitute an attempt 
to exercise ‘cooperative chill’ due to plain mistrust. The ‘cooperative chill’ in TTIP on the 
‘implementation’ of REACH imposed by the EP is of course a heavily-fought political 
compromise, or reflects an ‘exchange’ of give-and-take, in an already rather fragmented EP 
(with many parties) exhibiting several severe sensivities with respect to TTIP. Moreover, it 
would appear to be inconsistent with several other paragraphs in the same resolution, also a 
regular phenomenon in EP resolutions. One can also query what the ‘implementation’ of 
REACH really refers to. The present paper is not the place to analyse this question in-depth, 
but the giant REACH regulation cannot possibly be made to work satisfactorily by mechanical 
and pure ‘implementation’, as the resolution seems to suggest. REACH has and must have 
many processes which are governed by the overall objectives of REACH and disciplined by 
strict criteria, science for risk assessment and many other features, exercised e.g by the 
Commission, ECHA, the member states and expert committees. The four elements in the EU’s 
suggestions for chemicals in TTIP (Box 3) would not ‘undermine’ or negatively affect these 
processes. As noted, all four, in different ways, are discussed in international organisations, 
too. Does the EP fear that TTIP regulatory cooperation amounts to a duty-to-agree? This would 
be absurd. Does it fear that the involvement (mostly by comments and consultation more 
broadly) of the US will a priori exercise a chilling effect, or, lead to compromises that would 
be less ambitious than what the EU on its own would have decided (apparently this is what 
German government circles are afraid of)? But is it not true as well that, if TTIP would come 
into being, the EU could then exercise a similar influence in the US where chemicals are hardly 
less controversial than in the EU?  
It is also worthwhile to discuss briefly three of the four suggestions in Box 3 (ignoring data-
sharing). First on classification and labelling where the UN GHS has long been accepted by 
both the US and the EU (and many other countries). However, whereas OSHA in the US 
applies GHS, EPA does not. What is holding back the EPA from implementing a binding 
agreement that has the advantageous effect of lowering trading costs over the Atlantic and 
worldwide? It is said that this is due to pressures from leading pesticides companies (which 
include three European firms as well). Moreover, when applying GHS, one might attempt to 
harmonise further (e.g. in choosing the same classification for any given substance), but here 
the intricacies become greater. Why and when does the EU or US classify substance x as 
carcinogenic or not (and subsequently apply GHS)? Let us suppose that one would agree to 
apply a Vogel-type harmonisation-up and decide to always go for the highest classification on 
either side. On the face of it, this would rule out controversy. But there is a snag: the EU 
identifying x as a SVHC thereby automatically blocks its use in pesticides. Second, the 
                                                   
49 Under P8_TA-PROV(2015)0252 of 8 July 2015, para. 2. (c) (iii).  
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prioritisation for the evaluation of chemicals (and methodologies) does not affect the decision 
how and how stringently one protects, in case the substance turns out to be risky. This 
cooperation is meant to cut costs for the two parties by sharing the burden. Of course, this does 
require regulatory cooperation and precise agreement, case by case or in agreed programmes, 
presumably based on the chemical annex in TTIP. To block such useful cooperation (aiming 
precisely at cutting needless duplication), on the basis of the EP resolution, is simply not 
sensible.50 These are REACH processes that have to be pursued anyway.  
What one might suggest doing is that such (TTIP) programmes are first justified by scientific 
analysis in a report and discussed in the EP, so that trust is created. Third, ‘new and emerging 
issues’ such as endocrine disruptors (EDs) and nanomaterials has a scientific and a more 
judgmental or ‘political’ aspect. On the former, cooperation and burden-sharing seems 
eminently sensible in TTIP, OECD, WHO or indeed in all of them. On the latter, the EU has 
become quite prudent. For example, Commission Vice-President Frans Timmermans has 
decided to subject the draft delegated act on EDs, biocides and pesticides, which has passed 
its deadline for publication, to impact assessment, a sound decision in itself but mistrusted, by 
the same forces that are so sceptical in the EP, as a sign of unwillingness to extend the EDs list. 
For them it is a small step to suggest that this is ‘due’ to TTIP. These sensitivities are not a good 
reason to reject the option of regulatory cooperation on ‘new and emerging issues’ – not least 
because chemicals is a world market and derivatives in value chains can simply not be ignored. 
Nevertheless, one should exercise utmost prudence and make every attempt to build 
confidence-building measures rather than turn a blind eye to the problem. One may also want 
this issue to be shifted from horizontal regulatory cooperation to the specific chemicals annex 
where chemicals regulators govern the process. 
The chemicals section of TTIP has been much less controversial in the US, with most of the 
concern focusing instead on the 12-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which has been 
characterised as America’s “most ambitious trade deal since the North American Free Trade 
Agreement in the 1990’s”.51 Much of the political dialogue in the US does not distinguish 
between TTIP and TPP, but is opposed to free trade agreements more generally as weakening 
US regulatory protections.52 
                                                   
50 Paragraphs 2.(c)(v), (vi) and (viii) of the EP Resolution acknowledge this.  
51 Writing in the New York Times, Granville (2015) observes: ”Opponents in the United States see the pact 
as mostly a giveaway to business, encouraging further export of manufacturing jobs to low-wage 
nations while limiting competition and encouraging higher prices for pharmaceuticals and other high-
value products by spreading American standards for patent protections to other countries. A provision 
allowing multinational corporations to challenge regulations and court rulings before special tribunals 
is drawing intense opposition.” 
52 In a posting on techdirt.com, a blogger quotes from a press release from the Sierra Club: 
“Governments must take a page out of the history books and stop negotiating trade pacts that cut 
protections for our air, water, land, workers, and communities” and adds: “That last comment is a clear 
reference to TPP, but applies equally to TAFTA/TTIP”(see “US Free Trade Agreements Are Bad Not 
Just For The Economy, But For The Environment” at: https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131022/ 
10231424967/us-free-trade-agreements-are-not-just-bad-economy-environment-too.shtml).  
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6. Contrasting REACH and TSCA: Perceptions and critical assessment 
6.1 Why both are criticised? 
Curiously, there is resistance against TTIP chemicals negotiations going deeper both from the 
two sides in the negotiations and from NGOs. The position of business (CEFIC and ACC 
together) is accommodating this resistance by not offering an alternative view, but merely a 
useful, yet cautious preparatory route. From a trade-policy point of view, this is peculiar 
because the costs of TBTs in chemicals trade over the North Atlantic are amongst the highest 
of all industrial sectors. Lowering these TBT costs drastically would probably yield large 
economic gains. It is thus disappointing that the chemicals TTIP chapter does not reflect the 
original spirit of the partnership and is not more ambitious in focusing on removing or 
minimising TBTs.  
Can one understand this resistance from a regulatory point of view? Yes and no. No, one 
cannot, once one is willing and capable to assume a more rational and detached analytical 
view of how EU-US chemical regulation should be designed. Yes, one can, if one joins the many 
stakeholders and officials of the chemical policy-making communities on both sides, repeating 
all the time that the two regulatory regimes are too divergent. Nobody seems to ask the more 
relevant question whether the one or the other regime, or both, embody ‘good regulation’, 
applying GRPs (Good Regulatory Practices). And, as a corollary, whether, if GRPs were 
applied on both sides, the ‘divergence’ would shrink with it. ‘Better regulation’ would yield 
additional economic welfare, and if its application would indeed also shrink the divergence, 
TBTs would be much lower, too: a clear win-win. It is fairly obvious that both chemical 
regulatory regimes can be improved and a mutually compatible and sound way of doing that 
is to employ ‘Better Regulation’ principles, most of which have long been agreed 
transatlantically!53 Since the very purpose of TTIP is to reap economic gains and, as a 
subsidiary goal, to set proper world standards for good regulation benefitting everybody, why 
is such beneficial regulatory reform not embraced and pursued?  
Both chemical regimes are criticised, but for very different reasons. Rightly or wrongly, the 
TSCA is mainly criticised for not addressing existing hazardous chemical substances that 
meanwhile are asserted, feared or found to be of ‘serious concern’ and are or may soon be 
forbidden or restricted in other countries, including EU member states. In short, the TSCA is 
said to suffer from ‘under-regulation’: a number of sensitive, risky substances are said not to be 
tackled and the tools and intervention options for the EPA are too restrained. As Schwarzman 
& Wilson (2011) call it: TSCA generates a ‘data gap’ and a ‘safety gap’.54 How true this is 
remains unclear. There are isolated examples like asbestos,55 but can one generalise?  
REACH, on the contrary, is said by many to suffer from ‘over-regulation’: it supposedly imposes 
unreasonably heavy and costly means in order to ensure the availability of quite demanding 
                                                   
53 See e.g. Quick (2008a). See also US-EU High Level Regulatory Forum (2011) and Chase & Pelkmans, 
ch 2 in the volume.  
54 They also mention a technology gap, the lack of incentives under the TSCA to invest in ‘green 
chemistry’. 
55 Note. however, that the EPA banned asbestos in 1989 (54 Fed. Reg. 29,460), but this regulation was set 
aside by the courts in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir., 1991). Later, under pressure 
from EPA to re-regulate, manufacturers in the US entered into an agreement to take asbestos-containing 
products off the market.  
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data on the possible hazards of each and every substance above 1 tonne per year, for 
presumably some 30,000 substances, including complicated information and interaction flows 
up and down the value chains. There is no clarity at all whether or not all this data is ‘needed’ 
or even ‘read’ by regulators (despite their high costs) except in a limited number of instances. 
None of this directly supports health, safety and the environment, but some of it might, later 
on; the latter is all to be ensured in a lengthy second set of procedures of REACH, to wit, 
evaluation, authorisation and (new?) restrictions. The costs of the first stage (registration) now 
begin to be better estimated and they seem to be roughly double what was already seen as 
very high upfront costs in the constitutive days of the Regulation. This would imply some €4-
5 billion costs for registration and what it takes, alone.56. Nobody has any clue about the 
eventual benefits later on.57 By definition, these direct costs are not justified by the benefits 
because the latter cannot possibly be known even in a very crude estimate. The costs are only 
‘justified’ by a wholesale application of the precautionary principle (PP) to all chemical 
substances known (above 1 tonne). Note that these costly testing and registration requirements 
are not just applied to several thousands of substances about which a suspicion might exist 
but not ‘enough’ scientific evidence has been generated – then pre-caution makes sense and 
testing and research seem justified (if possible, proportionately).  
However, the idea is that one applies the (often-costly) PP to many thousands, indeed tens of 
thousands, of chemical substances, without having a clue whether that application is in any 
way justifiable in most of these tens of thousands of cases. This is surely not in keeping with 
the avowed notion of that principle, as elaborated e.g. in the famous European Commission 
(2000) paper on the Precautionary Principle. Application of PP requires there to be 
‘insufficient’ knowledge about risks, in other words, there have to be some compelling but as 
yet ‘insufficiently’ certain or clear risk indicators. If the PP requires a recognition of 
‘insufficient knowledge’, it follows directly that it cannot be applicable when there is no risk 
by any sign or indication. The PP may be justified, as historical examples of instances in which 
governments failed to act upon early signs of trouble may suggest,58 in instances where there 
are indications via victims and other possible evidence of harm as well as early signals in 
research, without being sure. However, severe and irreversible damage might be caused and 
a temporary PP application can be defended (e.g. BSE should have been dealt with PP at an 
earlier stage).  
The PP may ‘be better safe than sorry’, but it also brings with it the risk of false positives and 
excessively heavy intervention. Assume, for example, that of the 30,000 existing substances 
(from 1981), there are no signs of hazard in 25,000 instances, perhaps even more; some others 
suggest that a 40% benchmark would be safe, implying that 18,000 need not be investigated at 
                                                   
56 The 2003 Impact Assessment of REACH estimated some €2.3 billion of upfront costs (direct costs for 
registration, mainly testing), some €1.1 billion of which would materialise in the early stage. The CSES 
(2012) review report of REACH (for the Commission) reports instead a ‘mid-range’ amount of €2.1 
billion. With the big wave of numerous small-volumes registrations driven by SMEs in 2018 still ahead, 
and assuming a similar underestimation in 2003 for this wave, it further estimates that one would arrive 
at direct costs of some €4.5 billion. 
57 Note that, even if some benefits would be identified under ‘better regulation’ principles, this is not 
necessarily convincing, as – possibly - the same benefits might have been found with a far less-imposing 
system. As in impact assessment, one always has to think in terms of alternatives.  
58 See EEA (2001); a second report (“Late lessons from early warnings: Science, precaution, innovation”, 
was published by the EEA in 2013: www.eea.europa.eu/publications/late-lessons-2). 
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all. The point is that one cannot credibly assert that all or nearly all substances pose dangers 
for inflicting harm on consumers or workers. Many of these substances have been around for 
a long time and, in many cases, there are no suspicions whatsoever. Why the PP would have 
to be applied in a heavy way, or at all, for all other substances as well, merely on the criterion 
of tonnage, is still in need of justification. One may call this objection ‘risk-based’ – and indeed, 
it is – but it is just as much a proper application of PP. In the absence of any sign or indicator of 
risk, why impose such costs?  
It is, however, possible to assume a slightly more cautious position, with some justification, 
when observing that the C&L (classification and labelling) Inventory does comprise many 
substances with hazards (not necessarily risks, as exposures might be minimal). The authors 
have been informed that some 120,000 substances in the inventory have been classified with 
at least one hazard. Thus, it should be possible to develop a proportionate system, where 
substances (not known to carry a risk) could be subject to an alert system followed by testing, 
when there would be any reportable sign of this hazard having turned into a risk. That would 
reflect the spirit of PP.  
In all likelihood, there are now huge costs to registration in REACH, especially for SMEs,59 and 
no or next to no societal benefits anywhere on the horizon for the very large majority of 
substances. That is ‘over-regulation’, indeed, uniquely costly over-regulation, because of the 
wholesale application of PP to registration via tonnage (rather than risks or even a sign of it) 
and the separation of a lengthy trajectory of incurring costs (costly testing and data collection) 
from the search of societal benefits. There is a better case for demanding data collection for the 
registration of ‘new’ substances, but even here sophisticated forms of pre-selection of what 
might constitute hazardous chemicals would seem to be possible, underpinning a more 
targeted approach (as noted, some exceptions accepted by REACH do reflect this approach). 
These considerations carry over to different perspectives on priority setting for new chemicals, 
discussed in section 9.  
6.2 What we do not know about ‘divergence’? 
One can also argue, that in the final analysis, what matters for improving safety, health and 
the environment – the societal benefits - is the overall effect of the legal system as a whole in 
banning, restricting or (targeted and restrictedly) authorising specific substances, or their uses. 
The critical question in TTIP is not whether the legal procedures of the two regimes are so 
divergent, but whether they are good (enough) in delivering the desired societal benefits. To be 
more precise, how comparable are the bans, restrictions and (what in REACH is called) 
authorisations referring to the same substances on both sides of the North Atlantic? One would 
expect some divergence there because the TSCA (combined with other US federal laws on 
food, pesticides, etc.) might be ‘under-regulating’ (i.e. not all market failures are overcome), 
but it seems not so easy to establish firmly how severe that ‘divergence’ is. Moreover, the 
effects are not uniform in all areas. In some areas (such as suspect carcinogens in diesel 
exhaust, e.g.), the US tends to regulate more stringently than in Europe, whereas in others 
(such as suspected endocrine disruptors), Europe regulates more stringently. The authors have 
not been able to find authoritative evidence on the specifics of this divergence, let alone on 
                                                   
59 See Pelkmans, Schrefler & Gubbels (2013) for worrying mid-range evidence. 
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how ‘wide’ it really is. Adding up REACH (where four authorisations have been made so far60 
and several hundreds or more restrictions61 exist at the moment), some remaining chemical 
directives, pesticides and cosmetics regulation (prohibiting animal testing, unlike the US), the 
EU has probably banned or restricted more substances than the US, but that remains a 
conjecture. Ultimately, it is this factual divergence in some sensitive substances regulation, but 
more importantly the overlap of substances regulated both by the US and the EU, that matters 
for SHEC regulation and society. And it is this area of overlap where much more constructive 
and innovative transatlantic approaches could be proposed and scrutinised. Even if the 
overlaps were few and far between, say ‘mere islands of convergence in a vast sea of 
divergence’, the places where the two parties can come together are what is important for trade 
agreements. Later we propose a system whereby such areas of similar or mutually acceptable 
levels of regulation can be identified and unnecessary trade barriers gradually eliminated over 
time.  
7. Carved in stone: REACH and TSCA suffer from excessive rigidity 
7.1 REACH immobilises 
In order to conduct fruitful TTIP negotiations in chemical regulation and trade, reform of both 
regulatory regimes would be very helpful. However, these reforms do not ‘need’ TTIP; such 
reforms are justified in their own right. Reforms have a double rationale: i) both systems would 
be much improved if subjected to ‘better regulation’ principles, and ii) reforms should 
facilitate TTIP to generate major economic gains. This recognition has emerged in the US, but 
until recently, it has been hard to organise a winning, bipartisan coalition in Congress, leading 
to repeated delays up until today in reforming TSCA. One might also wonder how ‘deep’ the 
reform would be. But such a recognition is lacking in the EU. REACH has become a sacred 
cow! Alas, for the wrong reasons. Although the design of REACH is heavy and overly costly, 
especially in its processes, mainly due to the wholesale application of PP to registration (with 
demanding data) of all chemical substances, it is treated as ‘untouchable’. A steady flow of 
criticism from e.g. SMEs among others, is answered either with marginal or symbolic 
responses or neglect, or legal defences are formulated without ever reacting to the core of the 
issue.  
There would seem to be two reasons why REACH has become a sacred cow, thereby incurring 
unnecessary burdens for EU industry and ultimately the supply chain and possibly 
consumers, and, in addition, making meaningful TTIP negotiations more difficult or reducing 
                                                   
60 On 5 July 2015, the REACH Commission website listed four substances with an authorisation decision 
having appeared in the EU Official Journal, and a total of eight substances, with a range of applications, 
“pending adoption”. There are 166 substances on the candidates list.  
61 On 11 July 2015, the ECHA list of restrictions (http://echa.europa.eu/addressing-chemicals-of-
concern/restrictions/list-of-restrictions) identifies 64 restrictions in categories of substances, with 
subdivisions, totalling altogether 105 entries. Note that this list includes Annex XVII of REACH and 
‘old’ restrictions under the former Directive 76/769/EEC. Another five restrictions are under 
consideration. However, the total of 105 does not relate to individual substances only; thus, entries no. 
3, 28, 29, 30 and 40 refer to classes of substances (e.g. carcinogens, mutagen categories, flammable gases, 
liquids, solids, etc.). Moreover, quite a few entries refer to families of substances with the same name 
(e.g. azocolourants and azodyes). Any comparison with the US would thus have to carefully specify the 
individual restrictions on both sides.  
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them to modest features. First and foremost, it is about the very long duration of the 
implementation process. The official position is that the process will take 11 years, until 2018 
inclusive, when small-volumes registration will take place. That is an extremely long period 
during which EU bodies are in the frustrating position of having to implement, process and 
enforce numerous measures, without being able to change the legislation (only some annexes 
in modest or purely technical ways). This is a direct consequence of the design of the REACH 
Regulation, with its highly principled and wholesale approach of requiring very demanding 
data for all chemical substances and uses, as discussed before. But now that the REACH 
obligations are enshrined in EU law, SMEs cannot be treated on a more sensible and far less-
costly risk-basis for (say) 2018, as this would be regarded as discriminatory for all earlier 
registrations. REACH has stifled any initiative or even any serious debate on switching 
REACH towards a more risk-based approach, which need not and should not affect any eventual 
societal benefit but greatly reduce private costs (and to some extent public costs).  
As a result, a ‘deep’ TTIP approach in chemicals is doomed not to touch the instrumentalities 
of registration (no data, no market), which constitutes a big TBT where substances do not have 
any risk indication. Also, the communication over the value chain, often two-ways and 
costly,62 is just as valid for US exporters as for EU-based producers and users, irrespective of 
whether the substances are suspect or not. The REACH system now governs the TBTs as given, 
indeed, carved in stone, even though precisely this instrument – not a ‘level of protection’- 
should be at issue! In other words, the very long duration of REACH implementation creates 
an excessive form of rigidity that is immune to sensible calls for flexibility or amendments 
made in Europe, let alone, for reasons of ‘deeper’ TTIP negotiations or sensible REACH 
reform.  
One might perhaps entertain some hope that TTIP, as a ‘living’ agreement, might be able to 
address such issues after 2018. However, and this is the second reason, by 2018, REACH will 
only be relatively early in the complementary stage of going through heavy and time-
consuming authorisation procedures, and possibly new restrictions. The original idea behind 
authorisations was that SVHCs would be identified – and not known before or now better 
understood – so that substitution could be stimulated and ‘temporary permissions’ be given 
to companies using the SVHC. An outer bound of the expectation is the infamous SIN 
(Substitute It Now) list put together by the NGO community. As is well known, the candidate 
list of SVHCs, being continuously filled up with substances for authorisation, has an 
immediate chilling effect in markets (including value chains), although the whole point of the 
authorisation procedure is precisely to verify risk in-depth and subject the production and use 
to a careful societal balancing procedure.  
In any event, an outer bound would be that the EU would end up with the SIN list of 300-
minus substances. Yet, this would then have taken a decade or more of authorisation 
procedures. And the SIN list is a mere 1% of existing substances under REACH (if the 1981 
inventory is taken). However, that list was already made up in 2007,63 when REACH had not 
even begun. If the SIN list were so clear, and if market players do regard it as critical for their 
                                                   
62 See CSES (2012) and Pelkmans, Schrefler & Gubbels, (2013).  
63 The SIN list is a collection of SVHCs as identified by the NGO Chemsec (see 
http://chemsec.org/what-we-do/sin-list). Last updated 8 October 2014, the total list includes some 800 
possibly harmful chemical substances, but some 300 are now claimed to be SVHCs (by Chemsec). The 
list is not considered fully reliable from a scientific point of view. 
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reputation, why the huge data requirements for all substances over no less than 11 years? And 
why all these heavy procedures for many years more? Most restrictions actually pre-date 
REACH. However, these expectations are now in doubt. It is suggested in REACH circles that 
authorisations will be generated for decades to come, as data (including new data) may well 
prompt demands from member states to verify the SVHC nature of ever-more substances. 
Clearly, if this is true, it is of utmost importance that the US and the EU cooperate on the 
prioritisation of substances and try to reach convergence on when, and based on what criteria, 
a risk renders a substance a SVHC.  
TTIP in chemicals is perhaps doomed to stick to negotiating the forms of ‘regulatory 
cooperation’, as mentioned in Box 3. The ‘frozen’ attitudes on both sides, working from two 
instances of regulation subject to improvement (that is, not applying Good Regulatory 
Practices), and with regulators not in a position to question the instruments of the regimes – 
the objectives are not at issue - even when the arguments are convincing, are inconsistent with 
the very aims of TTIP: higher economic welfare, that is, ensuring societal benefits (overcoming 
SHEC market failures) with the lowest costs possible. The high TBTs in chemicals trade are a 
direct consequence of two regimes being subject to significant improvement; their ‘divergence’ 
is largely a consequence of their absolute immobility.  
7.2 Is the US incapable of ‘harmonising up’? 
One could also argue that the challenging question is not why Europeans would want to hang 
on to the perceived benefits of REACH, but why Americans would not want to use TTIP as an 
opportunity to ‘harmonise up’ to the system that the EU and many US academics and NGOs 
perceive as superior. 
The prevailing academic understanding of bilateral trade talks was defined in the mid-1990s 
by David Vogel in his influential book Trading Up.64 Professor Vogel studied a series of trade 
negotiations in the 1980s and early 1990s, including the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) between the United States, Mexico and Canada and concluded that 
‘harmonisation up’, adopting the more stringent standard for mutual gain, was nearly 
inevitable in trade talks, provided that certain minimal conditions were satisfied. Vogel called 
this the ‘California effect’, a term that seems somehow quaintly parochial by the standards of 
today’s more international discourse,65 but by which he meant a race to the top rather than a 
race to the bottom: 
Trade liberalization is most likely to strengthen consumer and environmental 
protection when a group of nations has agreed to reduce the role of regulations as 
trade barriers and the most powerful among them has influential domestic 
constituencies that support stronger regulatory standards. Thus, the stronger the 
commitment of nations to coordinate their regulatory policies, the more powerful is 
the California effect [i.e. race to the top rather than the bottom]. Likewise, the weaker 
the institutions created by regional or international trade agreements on treaties, the 
weaker the California effect.66 
                                                   
64 See Vogel (1995). 
65 However, an interesting elaboration of the interaction between Californian regulation and EU 
regulatory thinking is found in Vogel & Swinnen (eds) (2007); in Vogel’s later work, he demonstrates a 
U-turn for the EU becoming more and the US less precautionary. See Vogel (2012).  
66 Ibid., p. 8. 
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Vogel’s model is a simple one: each trade negotiation is imagined as a discrete single-play 
game between two players about a single regulatory issue; each side believes that it will benefit 
to some extent from the increased exchange that comes from reducing trade barriers, including 
non-tariff barriers from divergent regulatory systems. If more stringent regulations on one 
side are sufficiently supported by a domestic political constituency so that adopting them is a 
condition for obtaining the benefits from greater exchange, the more stringent regulation will 
be adopted by the other side, Vogel argues, provided that the costs of doing so do not exceed 
the anticipated benefits of getting a deal. Thus, according to Vogel, the greater the perceived 
benefits from reaching agreement, the greater the ‘California effect’ of inducing regulatory 
laggards to come up to the higher standards of their trading partners. The game becomes more 
complicated, and more realistic, if more than a single regulatory issue is subject to negotiation, 
so that trading one issue off against another becomes possible, but the logic is essentially the 
same: parties will agree to more stringent regulatory standards where the benefits from 
increased trade are greater than the costs from more stringent instruments of regulation. 
From the standpoint of Vogel’s model, harmonisation of chemical regulation through TTIP 
should have been an easy case: Europe’s REACH programme is generally perceived as more 
stringent than US regulation under TSCA, at least in the sense of having higher compliance 
costs.67 As described in more detail later, most of these extra costs are not a result of setting 
more constraining standards for exposure to substances that are regulated. Indeed, indications 
suggest that actual regulatory levels are remarkably similar in both systems, although far more 
precision on this point is desirable. Rather, the higher costs of compliance with REACH are 
due primarily to two factors: i) higher costs of compliance for preparing dossiers of health and 
safety data for all chemicals above certain production limits, whereas TSCA uses a much more 
targeted approach in which health and safety data are required for only a very small subset of 
chemicals, and until recently, none for existing chemicals that were already on the market when 
the law was enacted in 1976; and ii) some substances that are regulated in Europe are not 
regulated in the US, and vice-versa. 
Why didn’t the US side simply agree to adopt a more REACH-like system, at least for those 
substances that are already regulated by both the US and the EU, as predicted by Vogel’s 
model? One obvious answer endogenous to Vogel’s model could be that the perceived costs 
of adopting REACH on the US side were greater than the expected benefits from 
harmonisation. In a sense, the conclusion that perceived costs were greater than perceived 
benefits is tautological: there must be some rational reason why the negotiators were unwilling 
to ‘trade up’, as Vogel predicts they would.68 But exactly what were the perceived costs of 
adopting REACH (or a more REACH-like compromise) on both sides of the Atlantic, and why 
were these costs thought to be greater than the benefits of harmonisation?  
                                                   
67 For an argument that a regulatory system is not necessarily better merely because it imposes higher 
costs of compliance, see Renn & Elliott (2011). Moreover, according to Elliott & Elliott (2009), “a legal 
system is not necessarily ‘ahead’ merely because it stimulates a greater degree of precautionary behavior 
by those it regulates. Rather, the proper question is whether a legal system is achieving the degree of 
precaution that is deemed appropriate under the circumstances. Too much precaution, as well as too 
little, may have both costs and benefits, in terms of useful products or innovations that are needlessly 
not marketed.” 
68 See generally Leff (1974), who points out that the ‘discovery’ that the people often act to maximise 
perceived benefits and reduce costs is nominalism. 
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The puzzle becomes even more interesting when one realises that virtually all of the extra costs 
of complying with REACH are (once and for all) ‘sunk costs’ that have already been paid by 
many US-based chemical companies, because many of the chemical companies operating in 
the US also either sell some of their products in Europe or someone else who does sell that 
substance in Europe has already registered it under REACH and hence they have already been 
required to comply with REACH, at least for existing substances. Rational economic actors are 
not supposed to consider sunk costs, that are behind them, in making decisions about what is 
best for the future, although we know that sometimes people (and possibly even companies 
and nations) do not always behave ‘rationally’, as predicted by neo-classical economic 
models.69 It is also theoretically possible that the additional economic costs of complying with 
a REACH-like system in the US for new substances not already regulated under REACH were 
perceived to be greater than the perceived trade benefits from harmonisation, although we 
think that is unlikely, in part because US chemical companies frequently supply to the large 
European market. Even for substances that will be developed in the future, they must 
anticipate that they are going to have to comply with REACH.  
A simpler answer to why the US is not capable of ‘harmonising up’ might be the pressure from 
US industry not to accept REACH’s costly general registration requirements (with demanding 
data-development obligations) for existing chemicals and instead to accept – but also limit – 
new powers for restrictions in a reformed TSCA.  
8. Spill-overs and a world regime?  
8.1 Positive spill-overs with or without TTIP 
Our off-the-record interviews with participants lead us to conclude that regulatory 
convergence was taken off the table early because both sides perceived TTIP not as an isolated 
single-play game (as Vogel’s model implicitly assumes) but rather as a step in a larger process of 
defining the rules for commerce in chemicals in a rapidly-globalising economy. Neither side was 
willing to give up its position on what should be the emerging worldwide system of chemical 
regulation in order to obtain the immediate benefits of harmonisation through TTIP. The 
important, and generally overlooked spill-overs from the TTIP negotiations, are described by 
Lejour et al. (2014) as follows: 
The CEPR study [Francois et al., 2013] on the TTIP briefly deals with the spill-over 
effect to third countries, following the lowering of regulatory barriers between the US 
and the EU. These spill-over effects would not emerge if two small countries form a 
FTA, but this is different once the two largest economies in the world cooperate on 
regulatory issues. Direct and indirect spill-over effects are positive for 3rd countries 
and can be modelled. Direct spill-overs improve the trade possibilities of third 
countries with the EU and US without any further action on the part of 3rd countries – 
they are automatic. If the EU and the US streamline their regulatory procedures, this 
is subject to most-favoured-nation treatment (MFN) under the WTO and it becomes 
                                                   
69 “Behavioral economics recognizes that sunk costs often affect economic decisions due to loss aversion: 
the price paid becomes a benchmark for the value, whereas the price paid should be irrelevant. … 
Economic experiments have shown that the sunk cost fallacy and loss aversion are common, and hence 
economic rationality — as assumed by much of economics — is limited. ….” “Prospect Theory” 
Kahneman & Tversky; For an accessible summary, see http://youarenotsosmart.com/2011/03/25/the-
sunk-cost-fallacy/  
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also easier for firms from other countries to export to the US or the EU. … It makes 
sense that firms in other countries adopt the regulatory standards of large countries, 
when the former are closely linked to the EU, the US or both. This would also improve 
market opportunities for American and European firms in these third countries. … 
Of course, the greater the spill-overs to 3rd countries, the more TTIP outcomes begin to 
look like multilateral or plurilateral - rather than bilateral - results benefitting all. This 
important significance is further enhanced by the consequence that also TTIP itself 
would see its gains enlarge due to such spill-overs. 70 
This type of argument focuses primarily on the optimistic case in which the US and the EU 
reach agreement on a harmonisation approach, where “the two largest economies in the world 
cooperate on regulatory issues”. What they did not analyse until now is the other side of the 
decision tree of how spill-overs from TTIP may play out if the two sides do NOT agree on 
regulatory convergence.  
Many countries around the world are now developing their own national system for 
regulating chemicals. In October 2010, REACH-style legislation came into effect in China to 
regulate the environmental risk and hazard of China's new chemical substances, under the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) Order No. 7. Called Measures for the 
Environmental Management of New Chemical Substances, this regulation comprises 
notification requirements for new chemicals and catalogues hazardous chemicals among 
existing ones, but it hardly follows REACH principles despite elusive suggestions to the 
contrary (leading to the nickname ‘China REACH’).  
South Korea has also developed its own regulatory system, called K-REACH, which went into 
effect 1 January 2015.71 K-REACH was more explicitly “designed to closely mirror REACH”72 
(in a more risk-based and proportionate form). Other countries such as India, Thailand, 
Australia, Malaysia and Turkey are also reportedly developing their own national systems. 
Indeed, if the EU and the US were to reach agreement on a common approach to regulating 
chemicals, it would be hard for other countries to ignore their shared approach, as the 
combined EU-US market is the largest in the world, particularly for chemicals.73 But what 
happens if the US and EU do not agree, but instead maintain their divergent approaches? 
From the European side, Europe might well gain a trade advantage vis-à-vis the US if other 
countries adopt REACH-like systems, because European companies would be more familiar 
                                                   
70 Much the same point was also made by Daniel Hamilton, co-director of the CEPS/CTR project on 
TTIP, in his public remarks in Brussels on 9 April 2014, when the present project was announced. 
Hamilton observed that if the EU and the US were able to agree on their higher standards for protecting 
environment, safety and workers, these standards would become the de facto international standards 
going forward as opposed to lower “Asian standards.” Hamilton argued that the benefits to the EU and 
US of setting the bar higher far outweighed the small differences between the two. 
71 See the website dedicated to Korea’s own regulatory system for chemicals 
(www.thereachcentre.com/site/content_south_korean_chemicals_info.php).  
72 Ibid. 
73 According to Eizenstat (2013), “The EU and US together account for almost half of global output of 
goods and services and almost a third of global trade – almost $1 trillion annually.”. Specifically for 
chemicals, the 2012 domestic sales in chemicals of the US and the EU amounts to one-third of total global 
sales, with China alone having another one-third. In terms of world exports of chemicals, the US and 
the EU hold 40.5%, with China enjoying 14.3%.  
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with REACH requirements in Europe and would not have to bear the costs of duplicative 
regulation in other countries. The European Union is quietly promoting the REACH model to 
other countries. On the US side, US chemical companies maintain that they are not yet ready 
to concede that REACH represents the future of chemical management worldwide. They still 
hold out hope that more targeted approaches, represented by the Canadian Chemicals 
Management Plan (CMP),74 and pending TSCA Reform legislation may prevail over the long 
run as the model for a harmonised international system. 
8.2 US industry objections against REACH 
The essential difference between the Canadian Chemicals Management Plan (CMP) and 
REACH is that under the CMP, experts agree in advance on high-priority substances and only 
require submission of test data for those substances. Proposed bipartisan amendments to 
TSCA that are supported by industry in the US adopt a similar approach, in which the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) would conduct rule-making to categorise substances 
are either ‘high risk’ requiring further analysis, or ‘low risk’ so that they can be marketed 
without further studies.75 This carries forward to existing substances in the current approach 
of the TSCA ‘pre-manufacture notification’ programme, under which EPA uses predictive 
techniques, such as computer models and ‘structure activity relationships’ (SARs) or 
‘quantitative structure activity relationships’ ((Q)SARs76) to predict whether substances are 
likely to be hazardous in silico (i.e. through computer simulations) rather than requiring animal 
or other test data. Moreover, pathway-based toxicological testing in cell lines is thought by 
many to be the future of toxicology.77 
Many US companies believe it is unnecessarily wasteful to require comprehensive testing for 
all substances if science can target limited resources on substances that are most likely to cause 
problems. There are also independent critical voices. One of the present co-authors has 
written:  
The new REACH program in Europe requires private parties to submit enormous 
reams of data about the safety of chemicals to a new government agency. In our view, 
one fatal flaw in programs such as REACH is that its drafters appear to imagine that 
sufficient analytical resources can be marshaled at the governmental level to conduct 
all of the risk assessments that need to be conducted in a complex industrial society. 
We believe that this assumption is incorrect, and that the overwhelming majority of 
                                                   
74 For a description, see http://chemicalsubstanceschimiques.gc.ca/plan/index-eng.php  
75 §4(a), Chemical Safety Improvement Act, S. 1009, 113th Congress, 1st Session, 
(https://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/1009/text). 
76 For an explanation, see http://ihcp.jrc.ec.europa.eu/glossary/q-sars-quantitative-structure-activity-
relationships  
77 See generally Committee on Toxicity Testing and Assessment of Environmental Agents (2007), 
National Research Council, “Toxicity Testing in the Twenty-First Century: A Vision and a Strategy”. In 
a brief accessible summary, the US National Academy of Sciences (http://dels.nas.edu/dels/ 
rpt_briefs/Toxicity_Testing_final.pdf) writes: “The report envisions a new toxicity-testing system that 
relies mainly on understanding ‘toxicity pathways’ – the cellular response pathways that can result in 
adverse health effects when sufficiently perturbed. Such a system would evaluate biologically 
significant alterations without relying on studies of whole animals.” See also “Toxicity Testing in the 
21st Century: Better Results, Less Use of Animals”, 25 The Environmental Forum 46, Mar/Apr 2008. 
30  ELLIOTT & PELKMANS 
 
the data assembled at great cost by industry in response to the REACH program will 
remain unread in government files.78 
One key difference between REACH and the US/Canadian approach is that under REACH, 
prioritisation occurs after data submission in terms of what dossiers will actually be reviewed 
by government as opposed to prioritisation in the US and Canada before requiring data to be 
generated and submitted. But it should be noted that REACH proponents in Europe believe 
that requiring the data to be generated is good in and of itself (especially in terms of increasing 
awareness in industry), whether or not government considers it for purposes of regulating. 
If it were correct that current and emerging science allows us to predict in advance with a 
higher degree of confidence than in the past which chemical substances are likely to be ‘bad 
actors’, and to focus greater regulatory scrutiny on those, then the extensive efforts to test all 
substances, even those that are highly unlikely to prove hazardous, could be seen as costly 
‘dead-weight losses’ unnecessary expenses that do not contribute to protecting health and 
safety. In Europe, views are mixed. Defenders of REACH assert that compiling and submitting 
comprehensive test data on the safety of substances promotes public confidence,79 even if 
government resources are insufficient to actually review all the dossiers that have been 
submitted.  
Spill-over effects not only multiply the benefits of harmonisation; they also multiply the costs 
of agreeing to an inefficient duplicative system. Thus, for industry on both sides of the Atlantic, 
the calculus was not merely whether the benefits of harmonisation in TTIP were greater than 
the extra costs of trading up, as envisioned by Vogel, but whether the benefits exceed costs 
when both positive and negative spill-overs from TTIP to anticipated future regulatory 
systems around the world are taken into account. 
9. What really matters: SHEC equivalence and market access 
The stated rationale for giving up on the possibilities of incremental harmonisation or 
regulatory convergence before the negotiations even began, boils down to the idea that 
REACH and TSCA are “very different” (in the words of the industry joint position paper) or 
“too different with regard to some fundamental principles” (in the words of the EU negotiation 
position). 
But that observation, while true, avoids or by-passes the relevant question. Negotiations over 
a free trade agreement always begin from the starting point that regulatory systems on the two 
sides are different. The proper question is whether the differences in regulatory processes are 
so ‘fundamental’ that they cannot reasonably be bridged. It seems never to have occurred to 
the TTIP negotiators that, even though processes and ‘fundamental principles’ of regulation 
may differ, the actual outcomes of these divergent processes are substantially similar in some 
areas, or at the very least ‘adequate’ to protect the public, in cases when substances ARE 
regulated by both sides. The main difference between the US and Europe seems to be that 
                                                   
78 See Elliott & Elliott (2009, p. 74). 
79 The mid-term review of REACH (CSES, 2012) finds practically no empirical support for this greater 
confidence. Pelkmans, Schrefler & Gubbels (2013) reach the same conclusion.  
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Europe often regulates on a precautionary basis but the US holds off for more definitive science 
that will stand up in court if challenged.80  
Empirical studies of the actual results of chemical regulation in the US and the EU suggest that 
despite assertions about ideological and rhetorical differences, such as the precautionary 
principle versus risk assessment as philosophies for regulating chemicals, the actual results of 
regulation in some area are not very different between the US and EU,81 at least for many 
substances that are regulated in both. Merely as an illustration of this similarity, we compared 
the chronic oral and drinking water limits for the top 30 chemicals by volume released to the 
environment in EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory. Table 1 below shows that for those substances 
for which both the EU and US had exposure limits, 75% (12 of 16) differed by less than a factor 
of 3. Only one (xylenes) differed by more than a single order of magnitude (10x). From a 
toxicological standpoint, differences this small at low levels such as those involved here are 
insignificant.  
Table 1. Exposure limits of chemicals: US-EU regulatory comparison  
Substancea Difference < 3x US EU value 
Zinc 3E-1 SE-1 CRb 
        
Arsenic 0.01 0.01 DWc 
Lead 0.015 0.01 DW 
Copper 1.3 2 DW 
Nitrate 10 (as N) 50 (as NO3) DW 
Barium 2 0.7 DW 
Toluene 8E-2 2.23E-1 CR 
Toluene 1 0.7 DW 
Chromium VI 3.E-3 5E-3 CR 
Total chomium 0.1 0.05 DW 
Nickel 2E-2 5E-2 CR 
Chlorine 4 5 DW 
        
  Difference > 3x 
Substance US EU value 
Arsenic 3E-4 1E-3 CR 
Barium 2E-1 2E-2 CR 
Styrene 0.1 0.02 DW 
Xylenes 10 0.5 DW 
a. Listed in order of total volume released to the environment in the US reported in EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory 
(highest to lowest) for which comparisons were possible because regulated in both the US and the EU. 
b. CR = chronic oral exposure limit in mg/kg-day. 
c. DW = drinking water limit in mg/L. 
                                                   
80 For criticism and suggestions for improvement of the current European approach to the use of science 
in risk regulation, see Schrefler & Pelkmans (2014). See also Charnley& Elliott (2002), who argue that 
broader availability of judicial review by private parties challenging government regulation makes 
regulating based on suggestive but not yet definitive science more difficult in the US. 
81 See Renn & Elliott (2011).  
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In every case, differences in the actual stringency of regulation were inconsequential, despite 
the fundamental differences in the processes, systems and philosophies that had been used to 
reach the results. It is important to note, however, that only about half of the substances (16 of 
30) were regulated by both sides; in some instances the US regulated but the EU did not, but 
in more cases in this small sample, the EU regulated but the US did not. Of course, we are 
reluctant to draw any broad general conclusions from this small sample. What is important 
for our purposes is that there were some areas of overlap where duplication could be 
eliminated. 
It is true that drinking water is not typically shipped across the Atlantic, but what these 
examples suggest is that despite differences in legal procedures, when the two sides regulate 
a chemical, sometimes they regulate it with similar stringency. On reflection, these conclusions 
are not surprising. The science is the same on both sides of the Atlantic, and regulators in the 
US and the EU are both trying conscientiously to protect public health and the environment 
with an adequate margin of safety to the best of their ability and judgment. It is not surprising 
that sometimes they would reach similar outcomes. 
Admittedly, this is not the whole story, as some substances may be regulated in the EU but 
not the US or vice versa. European opposition to TSCA centres around the perception that 
many risky substances are not tackled in the US (but this does require a much broader 
inspection than TSCA alone; see Box 1). As noted, a precise and verifiable survey of these 
divergences seems not to be available and is much needed. But where both sides have ‘tackled’ 
a high-volume substance, regulatory limits in this small sample turn out to be remarkably 
similar. This suggests that the TTIP negotiators were wise to focus on expanding technical and 
scientific assessments, which have tended to come out very close to one another in the past. 
The relevant case for trade negotiations, however, is whether, when one side has regulated 
something, the other partner should have enough confidence that it is willing to accept those 
results without duplicating its own regulatory processes. The absence of significant differences 
in this example where both sides have addressed high-volume substances, should give 
confidence that in at least some instances, as former Ambassador Eizenstat (2103) put it, “we 
should have confidence in the 21st century that the regulatory standards in both the EU and 
US are adequate to protect our publics and should be accepted … ” 
International negotiations often begin this way with each side insisting that its system is best. 
The more productive question is whether the other side’s system is good enough, given one’s 
SHEC objectives.82 For trade negotiations such as TTIP to succeed, both sides must move 
beyond familiar national legal procedures for regulating chemicals, to ask whether the actual 
results are comparable and acceptable in terms of protecting against risky chemicals, despite 
differences in the legal procedures that lead up to them. Ultimately, this is about the SHEC 
objectives, the societal benefits the citizens and workers care about. Comparability includes, 
however, both what substances need to be regulated and how stringently they are regulated 
once regulation is put in place.   
                                                   
82 See Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory Cooperation, 1 May 2012, §1 
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201200327/pdf/DCPD-201200327.pdf: “[i]n meeting shared 
challenges involving health, safety, … environmental, and other issues, international regulatory 
cooperation can identify approaches that are at least as protective as those that are or would be adopted in the 
absence of such cooperation.” 
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Perhaps the particular high-volume chemicals in water in Table 1 are an exception. We really 
don’t know objectively how much convergence in outcomes actually exists despite differences 
in regulatory processes. But even if areas of similar regulatory outcomes are ‘islands of 
convergence in a vast sea of difference’, they show that in some areas greater harmonisation 
for mutual benefit should be possible. Plus the size of the islands of convergence would be 
expected to grow over time as TSCA reform is implemented and greater collaboration occurs 
between the US and the EU at the scientific and technical level. 
The challenge for a ‘living’ TTIP is to create a process that will i) gradually identify other 
islands in which regulatory outcomes are similar, or at least, ‘good enough’ to protect the 
public, and ii) provide a mechanism to eliminate needless duplication and inconsistency in 
those islands, however large or narrow they may be. 
10. A proposal: Unilateral recognition under TTIP  
To date, those seeking convergence of regulatory systems have tended to focus on ‘mutual 
recognition’, the idea that each side will accept the other’s regulation as adequate.83 This 
approach is particularly problematic when one side has regulated a substance but the other 
has not. Would the European side be required to accept a US EPA decision not to regulate 
because risks were assessed to be very low? That is not likely to happen, at least not any time 
soon, as many Europeans apparently still perceive Americans as swimming ‘in a toxic soup of 
poisonous chemicals’ (as Europe itself presumably also must have been before REACH was 
enacted in 2006). It remains surprising why so few Europeans seem to wonder why US citizens 
would accept that, not to speak of workers, but we refer to the discussion in section 4.  
There are, however, other approaches to achieving greater regulatory convergence that may 
be more promising, particularly when one side or the other is particularly ‘dug in’ about the 
superiority of its system, as some groups and some governments in Europe appear to be about 
REACH, and the US appears to be about risk-based regulation. 
An option that one of us has proposed is called ‘optional asymmetric recognition’84 Under such 
a system, a regulated party would be given the option to opt-into the regulatory system for a 
chemical that is perceived by the TTIP negotiating parties as more stringent, such as REACH. 
Thereby, the costs of duplicative regulatory processes in the second country could be avoided 
in at least some instances in which “the game was not worth the candle”. It is even possible to 
trade asymmetric recognition in one area, where one side is perceived as more stringent, for 
asymmetric recognition in another area, where the other sides’ regulations are perceived as 
more stringent. (This is actually the usual situation in negotiations, in which it is rare to trade 
like for like; rather, the path to a successful negotiation generally involves trading away 
something that one values less but the other sides values more.) 
                                                   
83 For a classic statement of the case for mutual recognition, see Eizenstat, supra note 42. For the many 
forms of mutual recognition, including MRAs, see Jacques Pelkmans & Anabela Correia de Brito, Study 
on Mutual Recognition Agreements, OECD, Paris, forthcoming (2015). A survey of how mutual 
recognition works in the goods and services markets in the EU is found in Jacques Pelkmans, Mutual 
recognition : economic and regulatory logic in goods and services, in : T. Eger & H-B. Schaefer, ed.s, 
Research Handbook on the economics of EU law, Cheltenham, E. Elgar, 2012.  
84 The discussion of “optional asymmetric recognition” is based on a presentation by Donald Elliott to 
the European Risk Forum in Brussels, 11 June 2013. 
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If a company decided that the potential ‘over-regulation’ under REACH was not worth 
arguing about, the company could decide to have the REACH restrictions become legally 
binding in the US, and thereby avoid the costs of going through a duplicative regulatory 
process in the US These conditions are most likely to be satisfied when (1) the costs of going 
through duplicative regulation are relatively high, but (2) the marginal costs of accepting over-
regulation are relatively low, such as because the company expects to sell the same product 
everywhere anyway. For example, assume that a pesticide is already registered in the EU, and 
the producer intends to sell exactly the same formulation in the US If we know that EU 
regulation is more stringent, what is the value in requiring the company to re-register the 
product in the US? The same would be true for anti-microbials, or additives for cosmetics. 
Companies should have the option of accepting a more stringent regulatory result as the de 
facto international standard. In this way, a de facto harmonised standard may develop 
internationally from the bottom up, rather than top down, as many countries gradually defer 
to a single regulation as adequate to protect their publics. In practice, many companies selling 
products internationally already, adopt a single design standard for their products worldwide 
rather than making different products for different markets depending on vagaries of local 
regulations. 
But optional asymmetric recognition would not work in the other direction: EPA’s failure to 
regulate something, or having less stringent regulation than under REACH, would have no 
legal consequences. Thus, optional asymmetric (or, unilateral) recognition differs from mutual 
recognition in that it is a one-way street, and that it is optional, not automatic. But optional 
asymmetric recognition has the advantage that some of the gains from eliminating duplicative 
regulatory burdens can be achieved in a situation where only one side trusts the other to 
regulate adequately albeit perhaps too stringently. Thus, if the US side believes that EU 
regulation under REACH may be too stringent in some instances, but the EU believes that US 
regulation is not stringent enough in some instances, mutual recognition is a non-starter. Yet, 
there still may be some situations in which some gains are still possible through asymmetric 
(i.e. unilateral) recognition of the other side’s regulation as adequate and these potential gains 
should not be left on the table in TTIP negotiations. Gains from optional asymmetric 
recognition would generally occur when the costs of duplicative regulation are greater than 
the excess costs of what is perceived to be ‘more stringent than necessary’ regulation. It may 
seem intuitive that there would be few such situations, but that is not necessarily the case if 
companies are manufacturing and selling into multi-national markets, as they often are for 
chemicals. If a company is selling in both the US and the EU, and is already regulated in the 
EU, requiring the company to go through a duplicative regulatory process in the US when it 
would be willing to carry over EU regulation into the US, is a pure and costly deadweight loss. 
Moreover, to maintain public confidence, the most stringent standard by a major trading 
partner may well become the de facto regulatory standard worldwide. Why not negotiate an 
agreement that US companies may opt in to REACH regulation in the US when they do not 
object to doing so?  
11. Conclusions 
As Otto von Bismarck famously stated in the remark that we quote in the epigraph at the 
beginning of this paper, “Politics is the art of the possible.” From that standpoint, the TTIP 
negotiators were probably wise to focus on the modest but important goals of eliminating 
tariffs, sharing datasets, standardising labeling and expanding sharing the technical work of 
assessing priority chemicals at the scientific level. While proponents of harmonisation of 
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regulatory systems, such as Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat, admonish us that “we should have 
confidence in the 21st century that the regulatory standards in both the EU and US are 
adequate to protect our publics and should be accepted”,85 regrettably, that mutual confidence 
that he asserts “should” be taken for granted, does not yet exist. The difference between the 
EU and the US over whether regulation should be precautionary, or based on more mature, 
demonstrated science continues to be a fundamental divide at this time. Perhaps greater 
confidence will come later in the 21st century after a period of working together at the technical 
and scientific level.  
One critical focus we strongly advocate is to establish authoritatively in what areas the level 
of SHEC protection for substances which are regulated on both sides is similar. Establishing 
this is, as we have shown, a major task in and by itself. In areas where that similarity is found, 
it would open possibilities for much greater ambition in TTIP for chemicals. Unfortunately, 
but also surprisingly, the knowledge about the areas and substances which are regulated in 
some form (be it by precisely identified regulation by agencies or in annexes of a range of laws, 
or otherwise, including judicial review and the chilling effect of liability suits) is rather 
imperfect, in particular in the US. Knowing the possibilities for liability cases in the US and 
realising that chemical substances are regulated outside TSCA (under other laws and statutes, 
and by federal agencies) far more often than under TSCA, the European perception that 
protection against risky chemicals in the US is often lousy or even absent, is almost certainly 
profoundly mistaken. We recommend that TTIP should include a trans-Atlantic body that is 
assigned with assessing objectively the actual outcomes (i.e. levels of protection against risky 
chemicals) of divergent regulatory processes and identifying those areas where differences in 
the level of protection are not material, that means, equivalent. These findings should lay the 
foundation for greater but well-targeted ambition in lowering the costs of TBTs, so high in 
trans-atlantic chemicals trade. Getting US and EU negotiators (and the governments behind 
them) out of their trenches may well hold significant promises for economic gains, without 
affecting in any way the achieved protection against risky chemicals.  
However, apart from this very long run perspective, we also discuss at some length the EU 
suggestions done in November 2014 and some of the background issues behind those. We 
regard them as modest, given what TTIP stands for from its start, but useful. However, 
chemicals trade suffering from the second-highest TBTs over the North Atlantic, the EU 
suggestions are expected to do little in reducing TBT costs in the short to medium run. 
Nevertheless, the EU suggestions, modest as they are, might have become more problematic 
because of the somewhat defensive EP TTIP resolution of 8 July 2015 although the authors are 
not convinced that this is necessarily the case. Seen in this political climate, what might be 
regarded (e.g. by the authors) as a modest proposal for chemicals in TTIP – never mind, the 
US position on chemicals about which little is known - may well be the maximum possible for 
a while to come.  This is regrettable but a political fact of life. It renders the main massage in 
our paper even more crucial: in the final analysis, what really matters is where the US and the 
US do protect citizens and workers against risky chemicals and, if both do this in an equivalent 
manner, how can trading costs be sliced without ever touching SHEC ojectives ? Finally, we 
suggest an easy and relatively simple solution to facilitate market access and reduce the costs 
of duplication for companies selling in both the EU and US markets, in case the substance is 
                                                   
85 Stuart E. Eizenstat, A new transatlantic partnership (April 2013) (italics supplied), 
 http://esharp.eu/essay/23-a-new-transatlantic-partnership/, quoted supra page 26. 
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regulated on both sides. Called (asymmetric) unilateral recognition, it would allow a company 
to opt-in into the most stringent of the two regulatory regimes for substance z, thereby having 
to comply only once, and get automatic recognition, hence market access, in the less tringently 
regulated market (for this substance). For those substances, costs could be cut considerably. 
Many chemical companies including SMEs do indeed sell in both Europe and the US and 
would benefit directly without setting up TTIP harmonisation. By definition, it would imply 
a race-to-the-top for these substances.  
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